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Income Taxation and Asset Valuation (II)
The Value of Preferential Taxation
THEODORE S. SIMS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The predecessor to this Article explored the properties of an income tax that uses economic depreciation in measuring capital in* Professor, Boston University School of Law. About ten years ago, while surveying the
history of U.S. income taxation of original issue discount in a class on the taxation of
financial instruments, including the taxation of gain on such debt as ordinary income on
surrender under the law from 1954-1969, the author assigned an exercise that required the
students to investigate the impact of that treatment on the value of a pure discount bond as
the marginal tax rate changed. After eliciting the basic after-tax value of the asset, and
then the increase in value resulting from an increase in the marginal tax rate from 30% to
40%, I added, to the best of my recollection, "And, as you can see, the after-tax value
continues to increase as the marginal rate goes up." A hand went up at the back of the
class. A student, whose identity I have since been unable to track down, said, "Not in my
spreadsheet it doesn't." This Article is dedicated to that student, whoever and wherever he
may be.
Since the first real draft of this Article, about five years ago, it has benefited from
presentations at the Harvard Law School and the Boston Tax Forum. The author is also
grateful to John T. Adney, Linda Bui, David Garlock, and James S. Halpern for comments
on the earliest version. In the course of its development it received more than ordinarily
thoughtful and searching criticism, for which the author would like in particular to thank
Thomas Brennan, Louis Kaplow, and David Weisbach, as well as Jake Brooks and Alvin
Warren. A special debt is owed to Daniel Halperin, who took the time to offer detailed
suggestions of both a substantive and editorial nature that prompted a wholesale revision
of the paper. Not every suggestion made it in. Research assistance at various stages of this
project from Robert Guth, David Brigleb, Ying Chen, and, in particular, Leonard
Greenberg and Wenfeng Su is gratefully acknowledged. Errors all remain mine.
There is a final irony to the project. About three years ago, when cleaning out my office
for a temporary move, I took the occasion to edit down and discard most of the extensive
chronological file from my four years at the Treasury tax policy office that I had dragged
around with me ever since. In doing so I came across a memo, dated April 9, 1978, that I
wrote to Dan Halperin in his capacity as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Legislation,
discussing the implications of imposing some sort of surrender charge on early surrenders
of deferred annuity contracts, to take back some of the benefits of deferral enjoyed
through those contracts. (Such a provision entered the Code as § 72(q).) Both the cover
memorandum, and the examples that it attached, clearly identified the valuation property
at the heart of this Article, which neither Peter Brady, whose work is discussed in Part IV,
nor I managed to "discover" until well over thirty years later. Who knew? Given the
memorandum's age, and that it is of a factual nature, the author believes the Treasury
Office of Tax Policy would not find its disclosure to be objectionable; a facsimile of the
memorandum (without) attachments is reproduced in the Appendix.
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come.' This Article investigates some fundamental properties of an
income tax that does not. The predecessor illuminated the equiva-

lence between economic depreciation and accrual taxation, and highlighted the insight, due to Paul Samuelson, 2 that either produces asset

values that are independent of their holders' marginal rates, even in a
system with graduated rates (and even if those rates vary over time). 3
The current Article explores in qualitative terms the value of "preferential" departures from valuation-neutral taxation.
The common understanding is that the benefit of an exclusion from
gross income or a deduction in computing taxable income increases
with the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. An extension of that insight is
that deductions or exclusions that are "preferential," in the sense that
they depart from some norm about what constitutes an appropriate
tax base, confer benefits that likewise increase with the recipient's
marginal rate. The conclusion that the benefit of "subsidies" delivered through the tax system increases with the recipient's tax rateand, presumably, with their economic well-being-has long been a
conspicuous feature of debates about the proper contours of the income tax. 4 Although the issue does not seem quite so central a feature of tax policy discussions today, the impact of graduated taxation
on the behavior of economic agents still deserves to be properly understood; estimates of the benefits conferred by preferential aspects of
1 Theodore S. Sims, Income Taxation and Asset Valuation (I): Economic Depreciation,
Accrual Taxation, and the Samuelson Theorem, 66 Tax L. Rev. 217 (2012).
2 Paul A. Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant
Valuations, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 604, 604 (1964).
3 Sims, note 1, at 228-30, 238.
4 The view of preferential tax provisions as conferring subsidies that increase with the
marginal rates of the recipients originates with the work of Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Surrey's view
was first publicly articulated in a 1967 speech and given a fuller articulation after he left the
Treasury in 1969 to return to Harvard Law School. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a
Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government
Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 720-23 (1970) [hereinafter Tax Incentives]; see Stanley
S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax
Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 352, 360-61 (1970);
Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform (1973) [hereinafter Pathways]. The resulting
"upside-down" characteristic of the induced subsidies was a conspicuous feature
of the
criticisms leveled by Surrey and his colleagues at what were denominated (and have been
referred to ever since) as tax expenditures. E.g., Stanley S. Surrey, The Tax Reform Act of
1969-Tax Deferral and Tax Shelters, 12 B.C. L. Rev. 307, 317-18 (1971) [hereinafter Tax
Deferral]; see Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions:
A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 Tax L. Rev. 377, 383 (1972); Paul R. McDaniel & Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Use of the Federal Income Tax System to Combat Air
and Water Pollution: A Case Study in Tax Expenditures, 12 B.C. L. Rev. 351, 360-62
(1971). For a history of the tax expenditure notion, see Jonathan Barry Forman, Origins of
the Tax Expenditure Budget, 30 Tax Notes 537 (Feb. 9, 1986).
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federal budget process,
our income tax remain a systematic part of the
5

and a matter of ongoing academic interest.
What I investigate here in the context of capital income taxation is
the belief that the benefits of preferential taxation always increase
6
with the recipient's marginal rate. In so doing I distinguish between
provisions that confer a preferential tax rate on some subspecies of
capital income, on the one hand, and those that confer only a timing

advantage ("pure timing preferences"), on the other. In practice,

many preferential features of our income tax-the most familiar
gains-insurely being realization-based taxation of long-term capital
7 For analytic
timing.
preferential
and
volve both preferential rates
purposes, however, it proves useful to disentangle the two. What
emerges from that exercise is that, just as the conventional wisdom
has it, the benefit of a preferential tax rate does increase monotonically with the marginal rate that otherwise applies to the beneficiary.
But the central insight of this Article is that the value of a pure timing
preference-pure tax "deferral"-does not. The benefit of deferral is

(self-evidently) zero at a marginal rate of 0%; less obviously, that benefit also approaches zero as the marginal rate approaches 1 (100% if
Estimates of tax expenditures are compiled annually by the Office of Management and
on TaxaBudget as part of each annual budget presentation, and by the Joint Committee
GovernU.S.
the
of
Budget
President,
the
of
Office
Exec.
Budget,
&
tion. Office of Mgmt.
ment Fiscal Year 2018, at 127-67 (2017), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/
Cong., JCX-3files/omb/budget/fy2018/spec.pdf; Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 115th
2016-2020, at 27-48 (2017),
17, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years
4 97
1. They are also prepared bihttp://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=
Cong.
annually by the Congressional Research Service for the Senate Budget Committee.
on
Material
Background
of
Compendium
Expenditures:
Tax
Cong.,
Research Serv., 114th
Individual Provisions, (S. Prt. 114-31, 2016), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRTof ac114SPRT24030/pdf/CPRT-114SPRT24030.pdf. As discussed in Part II, the notion
inception and
counting coherently for tax expenditures was challenged virtually from its
Tax
has been persistently controversial. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive
[hereinafter
Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925, 952-53 (1967)
Subsidies" in the
Comprehensive Tax Base]; Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax
Fleming
National Budget, 22 Nat'l Tax J. 244 (1969) [hereinafter Tax Subsidies]; J. Clifton
Tax
Normative
a
from
Divorced
Be
Analysis
Expenditure
Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax
Tax Rev. 135
Base?: A Critique of the "New Paradigm" and Its Denouement, 30 Va.
(2010) (providing recent treatment and a canvas of the intervening literature).
at 720-23, 721
6 See Surrey, Pathways, note 4, at 36-39; Surrey, Tax Incentives, note 4,
M. Sunley,
Emil
411;
at
4,
n.23; Surrey, Tax Deferral, note 4, at 317-18; McDanel, note
J. Cordes,
(Joseph
76
75,
Policy
Tax
and
Taxation
of
Deferral of Tax, in The Encyclopedia
Robert D. Ebel & Jane G. Gravelle eds., 2d ed. 2005).
not the deferral
7 Largely for practical reasons, only the preferential capital gains rate,
Leonard E.
See
expenditure.
tax
a
as
treated
currently
is
of taxation until realization,
617 & n.6
613,
J.
Tax
Nat'l
56
Burman, Is the Tax Expenditure Concept Still Relevant?,
Simons,
C.
Henry
Simons.
Henry
surprised
have
not
might
(2003). Such a concession
Personal Income Taxation 100 (1938).
5
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prefer). 8

you
Since the benefit of deferral is zero at either extreme of
the rate schedule, but positive at marginal rates in between, it must
take on a maximum value somewhere between those extremes. As
the holder's marginal rate varies between 0 and 1, the benefit of deferral increases steadily up to a maximum, generally (although not invariably, but certainly for plausible discounting assumptions) in the
vicinity of 50%. Thereafter it steadily declines, approaching zero as
the marginal rate approaches 100%. That is the contribution of this
Article.
This phenomenon is generally characteristic of preferential timing,
across the range of settings in which it can arise. In outline the mechanism that underlies it is this. At the most basic level an asset is just a
sequence of future cash flows; its value is the present value of those
cash flows. Capital income taxation influences that value in two ways.
Everything else being equal, the tax-induced reduction in future cash
flow (from, say, C to C(1 - z), if the tax rate is z) reduces the value of
the asset; at the same time the tax-induced reduction in the discount
rate (from r to r(1 - z)) has an offsetting effect, elevating the value of
future cash flows. 9 Under some conditions those two tax-induced effects exactly offset one another, at every marginal rate and at every
point in the life of the asset, in which event taxation does not affect
the asset's value. When those conditions are not satisfied, however,
taxation does influence asset values. In the case of preferential timing-either by accelerating a deduction or (equivalently) delaying recognition of income-the beneficial impact of deferral on cash flow
increases with the taxpayer's marginal rate: For every $1 deferred, the
cash flow effect of deferral is not $1, but $z, so that the higher the tax
rate the greater the (temporary) tax savings from deferral. 10 At the
same time, the tax-induced reduction in the discount rate from r to r(1
- z) dampens that beneficial effect, by increasing the present value of
the future repayment, and that dampening also increases with the
marginal rate. Since those effects do not exactly offset one another,
8 Although, at sufficiently high marginal rates, that outcome, as a practical
matter, could
be circumvented by the availability of investments subject to preferential rates such
as taxexempt municipal bonds.
9 This is just a tax-induced illustration of the general proposition that asset values
vary
inversely with interest rates. E.g. Jonathan Berk & Peter DeMarzo, Corporate
Finance
182-83 (4th ed. 2017); Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers & Franklin Allen, Principles
of Corporate Finance 50 (11th ed. 2014). When a preferential rate influences
value
through its impact on both cash-flow and the discount rate those two effects act in
concert
to elevate value. See text and notes at notes 66-69.
10 That is, in one common way of thinking about deferral, the higher the tax rate
the
larger the "interest-free" loan from the federal government that arises from deferral.
Daniel I. Halperin & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Understanding Income Tax Deferral, 67
Tax L.
Rev. 317, 322 & n.16 (2014).
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their interaction produces value that is initially increasing in the marginal rate, up to a point, after which the interaction reverses, reducing
the value of deferral as the marginal tax rate approaches 1 and the
after-tax discount rate approaches 0, at which point deferral has no
value at all."
Despite the generality of this phenomenon, it proves to be complex
in detail. That is partly because discounting is nonlinear, and in part
because varying details of the settings in which deferral arises introduce subtle and not always intuitively obvious or readily explicable
variations in the valuation properties of deferral identified here. In an
effort to develop those properties systematically, I proceed in the following way. In Part II, I illustrate the basic valuation-neutrality of
"Samuelsonian" taxation, in which the cash flow and discounting effects of capital income taxation exactly offset one another, drawing on
was
the "canonical"'12 example of a pure discount debt instrument that(/).13
Valuation
Asset
and
central to the exposition in Income Taxation
Taking valuation-neutral taxation as the norm, I introduce in Part III
three simple variations on the taxation of that instrument that illustrate with fair generality the contrasting ways in which a preferential
rate and preferential timing, each in isolation, differ in their impact on
value. Among other things they suggest that, when explored in present values-as is natural when studying the impact of deferral on asset values-the benefit of deferral is maximized at marginal rates
marginal rate increasing
greater than 50%, with the value-maximizing
14
as the discounting horizon is prolonged.
Part IV explores in greater detail how and why this all comes about.
It also investigates the impact of preferential timing on funded, deferred compensation, a part of the tax system where it is extensively
deployed. In that setting it is more natural to evaluate the benefits of
has
11The much less frequently encountered phenomenon of disadvantageous taxation
depressing
initially
schedule,
rate
the
exactly the opposite effect, zero at either extreme of
the marginal rate
value to some minimum after which the depressing effect is dissipated as
continues to rise. See note 99.
and
12 See David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency
(1995).
739-40
731,
Rev.
L.
Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 Tax
least three different
Between 1940 and 1982, the U.S. tax system, as a whole, tried out at
by the
ways of taxing such instruments, before settling on the current regime, implemented
Long-Term
Sims,
S.
Theodore
see
1272(a);
§
IRC
rules.
original issue discount (OID)
47 Tax L. Rev.
Debt, the Term Structure of Interest and the Case for Accrual Taxation,
project to be
this
of
purposes
for
take
I
what
implement
313, 315-21 (1992). Those rules
the norm in taxing discount debt.
13 Sims, note 1.
found in
14 Mathematical generalizations of the insights developed in Parts III-V can be
and
Timing
Preferential
Sims,
S.
Theodore
the working paper associated with this Article.
Papers No.
Working
Economics
and
Law
Law,
of
School
Univ.
Boston
Income Taxation,
2 29 8 26
1 .
13-31 (July 24, 2013), https://papers.ssr.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
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deferral in terms of future values, representing the amounts accumulated when the deferred compensation starts to be taken down. In
that context the one other study of the valuation effects of timing of
which I am aware also finds that the benefit of preferential timing
generally changes value in the manner identified here. 15 In contrast,
however, it finds that the benefit of deferral is maximized at rates below 50%, with the value-maximizing marginal rate decreasing in the
duration of deferral. 16 It turns out that this apparent discrepancy can
be reconciled via the unexpected and somewhat counterintuitive finding, illustrated in Part IV and generalized elsewhere, that it turns simply on whether the benefits of deferral, arising out of otherwise
identical financial events, are expressed in present or future values.1 7
The examples in Part IV also reflect the somewhat surprising conclusion that a Roth IRA, usually thought of as offering a tax exemption
for investment income rather than a timing preference, nevertheless
exhibits the valuation properties of tax deferral that are identified
here, at least on the very assumptions that are typically deployed in
illustrating the equivalence of the benefits offered through Roth and
conventional IRAs.
Virtually all of what is developed in Parts III-IV is about the value
of preferential timing. It does not address the matter of asset valuation as such, to which I turn in Part V. For tax reasons, as illustrated
here, or otherwise, assets may have differing values to different holders. But a fundamental tenet of financial economics is that assets with
financially equivalent cash flows must trade at a single price.' 8 In the
field of taxation that tension has led to a substantial literature on the
pricing of the purest of tax-favored assets, tax-exempt municipal
bonds. The basic finding of that literature is that municipal debt securities are priced to produce a return to a "marginal investor," defined by their tax rate, equal to what they would earn after-tax on a
taxable instrument that is otherwise of comparable risk and maturity.
For investors at higher marginal rates-the "inframarginal" investors-tax-exempt bonds produce a benefit beyond what they would
15 Peter Brady, Inv. Co. Inst., The Tax Benefits and Revenue Costs of Tax Deferral 3-4,
28 (2012), http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_12-tax-benefits.pdf. The two studies appear to have
been almost exactly contemporaneous and were carried out in ignorance of one another.
Brady's report was posted on SSRN in September 2012; early that same month the initial
version of this Article was submitted and later accepted for publication.
16 Id. at 21, 24.

17 As discussed in Subsection IV.B.2, Brady's claim that his conclusions hold in present
as well as future value turn on his use of pretax rates to discount future accumulations,
which omits from his analysis the offsetting effect of tax-induced variations in the discount
rate on the present value of the cash flow effect of deferral. See text and notes at notes
120-123, note 130.
18 See Berk & DeMarzo, note 9, at 72-76; Brealey et al., note 9, at 54-55.
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earn on an otherwise comparable taxable investment, with that benefit strictly increasing in the inframarginal investors' marginal rates. 19
The analysis here suggests that something of the same general sort
should occur with respect to assets subject to a pure timing preference. It turns out that the maximum price that an investor would pay
for such an asset is strictly increasing in the investor's marginal rate.
But unless it is priced at what the highest bracket investor would pay,
the value of the asset to inframarginal investors will not (as with taxexempt bonds) monotonically increase; instead, in principle at least, it
will continue to behave in the manner identified in this Article, with
those investors continuing to experience after-tax values that rise and
then eventually fall with their marginal rates.
II.
A.

VALUATION NEUTRAL CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION

20

Haig-Simons Taxation and the Samuelson Theorem

To describe a feature of the tax system as "preferential" presupposes some baseline norm against which to identify preferential departures. Although the matter has been contested from the
beginning, it would not be unsafe to say that for much of the first 60
years of the now more than 100-year history of our modern income
tax, the norm was taken to be some version of a tax on "comprehen21
sive" personal income, as articulated by Robert Murray Haig and
Henry Simons, 22 intended roughly to include all individual command
over economic resources, at least insofar as they were reflected in
market transactions.2 3 Formally, Haig and Simons defined personal
income as the "money value of the net accretion to one's economic
power between two points of time, ' 24 consisting of the "sum of (1) the
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in
the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and
end of the period in question. ' 25 That is, it looks at the uses (rather
than the sources) side of the income identity, and in the process decomposes income into consumption and accumulation.
19See text and notes 146-47.
20 Those with a general familiarity with the Samuelson theorem on economic
depreciation and the contours of the Haig-Simons definition of income could safely
proceed directly to Section II.B.
21Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in The Federal Income Tax 1, 7 (Robert M Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in Am. Econ. Ass'n, Readings in
the Economics of Taxation 54, 59-62 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl Shoup eds., 1959).
22 Simons, note 7, at 50.
23 Id.; Haig, note 21, at 59-62.
24 Haig, note 21, at 59.
25 Simons, note 7, at 50.
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Neither component of the Haig-Simons decomposition has ever
been self-defining or otherwise free of controversy. Defining consumption has always had difficulty with nonmarket transactions and
receipts in kind, and more generally has been plagued by the difficulties of distinguishing "between what is and what is not economic activity," in particular between "consumption and [business] expense. '2 6
More importantly for present purposes, the issues raised by the accumulation component of Haig-Simons income-that is, of measuring
and taxing capital income 27-seem to be, if no more free of controversy, at least significantly more well-defined. However impracticable
it might seem, 28 accumulation-"the change in the value of the store
of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in
question"-read naturally, implies the taxation of property income
and gain as it accrues. So, in principle at least, the Haig-Simons definition historically has been identified with what (following Haig) the
26 Id. at 51, 54; see, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income
Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309, 313-14, 317-25 (1972); Thomas Griffiths, Theories of Personal
Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 Hastings L.J. 343 (1989); Mark G. Kelman, Personal
Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit
Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 831, 831-35 (1979); Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 Tax L. Rev. 679, 687-704 (1988);
see generally Surrey, Tax Incentives, note 4; Bittker, Comprehensive Tax Base, note 5, at
929-34; Bittker, Tax Subsidies, note 5, at 247-48; Stanley S. Surrey & William F. Hellmuth,
The Tax Expenditure Budget-Response to Professor Bittker, 22 Nat'l Tax J. 528 (1969).
27 The identification of lifetime consumption with the lifetime earnings of economic
agents who start out with no financial endowment has long implied an intimate connection
between the accumulation component of Haig-Simons income and the taxation of capital
income. That connection is reflected in the shibboleth that taxation of capital income
amounts to double taxation of savings. See John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, bk. V, ch.I, § 4, 544-46 (J. Laurence Laughlin ed., D. Appleton & Co. 1884) (1848);
Irving Fisher, The Nature of Capital and Income 252-53 (1906) [hereinafter Capital Income]; Irving Fisher, The Double Taxation of Savings, 29 Am. Econ. Rev. 16 (1939). It is
likewise reflected in the equivalence between a tax on consumption, defined as receipts net
of additions to (or augmented by withdrawals from) savings, as under a cash-flow personal
tax, and a tax that falls only on income from labor, not capital. See David F. Bradford &
U.S. Treasury Tax Policy Staff, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 110-11 (2d ed. Rev. 1984);
E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in Income, Employment and Public Policy: Essays in Honor of Alvin H. Hansen 300, 309-10 (1948), reprinted
in Readings in the Economics of Taxation, note 21, at 525; Surrey, Tax Deferral, note 4, at
312-14; William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 1113 (1974); see also Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1575, 1598-611 (1979) (providing an extended analysis of
the qualifications to that equivalence). At a practical level that latter relationship is what
accounts (with some assumptions) for the equivalence between the taxation of conventionally tax-favored retirement savings vehicles such as individual retirement accounts (cash
flow treatment under IRC §§ 219, 408) and their so-called "Roth" variants (wage tax treatment, under IRC § 408A). See Subsection IV.B.2.
28 Simons, note 7, at 100; cf. David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111, 1120-21 (1986) (discussing alternative
valuation methods for assets that are impractical to value on an annual basis); Andrews,
note 27, at 1116-17.
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late William D. Andrews denoted an "accretion-type" tax, 29 understood as a tax that ideally extends not just to current cash flow and
realized gains from property but to changes in the value of assets as
30
they accrue.
A pivotal virtue of taxing capital income as it accrues is developed
in Paul Samuelson's 1964 paper on economic depreciation. 31 Samuelson showed that taxing capital income while allowing a deduction for
economic depreciation leads to a system in which asset values are independent of the marginal rates of their holders. 32 In principle at
least, the use of economic depreciation leads to a system that is free of
tax-induced distortions in the values of depreciable assets, and so mitigates clientele effects and the temptation to engage in tax-induced
trading in such assets. What is more, while Samuelson's paper was
nominally about depreciation, it is actually a far broader formulation:
The "depreciation" function that gives rise to Samuelson's result produces in general a system of pure accrual taxation. 33 As such, it offers

29 Haig, note 21, at 59; Andrews, note 27, at 1113-16.
30 It is clear that both Haig and Simons regarded "personal income" as comprehending
capital income. Simons' position is underscored by his criticisms of the work of Irving
Fisher, an early, fervent proponent of taxing cash flow-"realized" income in Fisher's lexicon-which Fisher was insistent on distinguishing from a tax on accrued gains, which he
denoted by "earnings." Fisher, Capital Income, note 27, at 234-35; see Irving Fisher, The
Theory of Interest 25-28 (1930); Irving Fisher, Income in Theory and Income Taxation in
Practice, 5 Econometrica 1, 6 (1937) [hereinafter Income in Theory]; Simons, note 7, at 89100, 225-31. On internal evidence it is likewise clear that both Haig and Simons were
independently of the view that capital income properly included accrued but unrealized
gain. Haig, note 21, at 62-65. Simons' view of the matter is reflected in his criticism of the
views of E.R.A. Seligman, Simons, note 7, at 85-88, though Simons seemed to acknowledge
the possibility of falling back on realization as a concession to practicality. Id. at 100.
Somewhat more recently Jeff Strnad has argued that Haig-Simons income, properly interpreted, is better understood as consistent with a cash-flow rather than an accretion type
tax. Jeff Strnad, Taxation of Income from Capital: A Theoretical Reappraisal, 37 Stan. L.
Rev. 1023, 1024 (1985) [hereinafter Theoretical Reappraisal]; see Jeff Strnad, Tax Timing
and the Haig-Simons Ideal: A Rejoinder to Professor Popkin, 62 Ind. L.J. 73, 77 & n.16
(1986); see note 40.
Even to economists persuaded of the wisdom of taxing capital as well as personal services income, theoretical work on optimal taxation tends not to produce a comprehensive
tax base after the fashion of traditional Haig-Simons income. They do tend to find a role
for taxing capital as well as personal services income, but on other than definitional
grounds, and generally at differing marginal rates that are determined by very different
modes of analysis. See, e.g., James Banks & Peter Diamond, The Base for Direct Taxation,
in Dimensions of Tax Design 548, 550, 555 (2010); Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The
Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations, J. Econ.
Persp., Fall 2011, at 165, 166-67, 177-83. But see, e.g., Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption
Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 Yale L.J. 1081 (1980).
31 Samuelson, note 2.
32 Id. at 604.

33 Sims, note 1, at 228-33.
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a possibly comprehensive guide to structuring a personal tax that
34
reaches capital income while leaving asset values untouched.
Samuelson's insight thus provides a theoretical justification for accrual taxation of capital income, arrived at on other grounds by Haig
and Simons, in the design of a personal income tax. Whatever its

other shortcomings, and in principle at least, a personal income tax
that incorporates accrual taxation of capital income at uniform (albeit
graduated) rates will not produce tax-induced distortions of asset values.35 As far as broad-based taxes are concerned there are, of course,
alternatives to an income tax of that sort. Principal among them are
37
cash flow taxes of the sort envisioned by Fisher,36 Nicholas Kaldor,
and Andrews; 3 8 wage taxes, of the general sort used in the United

States to finance Social Security and Medicare; and indirect taxes on
consumption, such as retail sales taxes or value added taxes. 39 Among
all of them, however, an accrual tax, along the lines implied by the
Haig-Simons definition with the property formalized by Samuelson,
stands by itself in seeking to tax capital income as such. And since the
objective of this Article is to investigate the impact on value of prefer-

ential features of a tax on capital income, Samuelson's formalization
of what Haig and Simons envisioned provides a (perhaps, the) natural
norm.40 For the analysis that follows it serves as the point of depar34 Id. at 238-41.
35 By "uniform" I mean only that personal services and capital incomes are taxed at the

same rates. Samuelson's result has been shown to hold even when tax rates vary over time,
whether because of time variation in the rate schedule itself or time variation in the marginal rates faced by individual taxpayers. See Andrew B. Lyon, Invariant Valuation When
Tax Rates Change Over Time, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 433, 433-34 (1990); Theodore S. Sims, Economic Depreciation and Invariant Valuation: A Constructive Proof of the Samuelson Theorem 1-2 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 12-06, 2012), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2006557. Elaborating on more specialized examples offered by Marvin Chirelstein and Strnad, I show that what drives Samuelson's result is that, by taxing income as it
accrues, the impact of the tax in reducing cash flow from an asset is exactly offset by its
impact on the rate at which those cash flows are discounted, such that the two exactly
balance in every period and at every marginal rate. See text accompanying notes 53-55.
Consequently, the result survives the introduction of time-varying tax and discount rates.
Sims, supra, at 6-7.
36 Irving Fisher & Herbert W. Fisher, Constructive Income Taxation (1942); Fisher, Income in Theory, note 30.
37 Nicholas Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax (1955).
38 Andrews, note 27.
39 They also include hybrid wage and cash flow taxes, of the sort pioneered by the HallRabushka flat-tax, that form the basis for many of the more recent tax reform proposals.
Robert E. Hall, Alvin Rabushka, Dick Armey, Robert Eisner & Herbert Stein, Fairness
and Efficiency in the Flat Tax (1996); see Paul Ryan, A Better Way 33-34 (2016), http://
abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf (describing a progressive wage tax coupled with a cash flow tax).
40 Strnad has argued that a tax conforming to Samuelson's model (which he denotes a
"Samuelsonian" income tax) is distinct from the tax envisioned by Haig and Simons, and
that the tax that in his view most faithfully corresponds to what he calls the "Haig-Simons
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ture. So I begin in a world with a capital income tax that has no impact on asset values. From there I proceed to investigate what
happens when departures from that norm are introduced.
B.

Accrual Taxation and Invariant Valuation

The baseline illustration is a $10,000, seven-year OID (pure "OD,"
or pure discount) bond. It consists of a single $5131.58 outlay today,
followed by a single $10,000 receipt in seven years. 4 1 The implicit
"yield-to-maturity" on the instrument, 42 assuming that interest compounds annually, is 10%. Analogously, $5131.58, deposited in an account with a bank that paid interest at 10%, compounded each year,
would grow to $10,000 by the end of seven years, as recounted in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Bank Account (@ 10%)
Interest accrued during
Balance in account at
period
end of period
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

$ 5131.58
5644.74
6209.21
6830.13
7513.15
8264.46
9090.91
$10000.00

$513.16
564.47
620.92
683.01
751.31
826.45
$909.09

By the same token, $5131.58 invested instead in a seven-year pure
discount bond that makes a single payment of $10,000 at maturity,
again assuming annual compounding, provides a compound annual return of 10%; over the life of the instrument, its value would grow to
$10,000; and, at least assuming interest rates remained constant, it
43
would do so in exactly the pattern illustrated in Table 1.
ideal" is in fact a cash flow tax. Strnad, Theoretical Reappraisal, note 30, at 1024. That
claim is beyond the scope of this Article and deserves to be separately addressed. For
present purposes suffice it to say that the premise of what follows is at odds with that
assertion.
41 See Sims, note 1, at 235-38, 253 tbl.4, 254 tbl.5.
42 Yield to maturity of a debt instrument is defined as that interest rate, which, if used to
discount all payments pursuant to the instrument to present value, produces discounted
values that in the aggregate equal the instrument's issue price. E.g. Brealey et al., note 9,
at 46-49, 592-94; Reg. § 1.1272-1(b)(1)(i).
43 Even if interest rates and the value of the bond fluctuated in the interim, it would still
yield a 10% compound average annual return if held to maturity.
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It is on just those amounts that the holder would be taxed under

§ 1272(a), 44 as illustrated in Table 2. 45 The pattern of accrual depicted
in Column 1, in effect the sequence of "adjusted issue prices" of the
instrument over its seven-year life, 46 mirrors the account balances at

the end of each year if the same $5131.58 had instead been deposited
in a bank, accruing interest as depicted in Table 1. The annual increases in the adjusted issue price, which form the basis for what is
includible in the gross income of the holder under § 1272(a)(3), are
shown in Column 2. They consist in each period of the product of the
instrument's 10% yield to maturity and its adjusted issue price at the
beginning of that period, and they correspond to the interest accruals
in Table 1. 47 The resulting tax liabilities, assuming to begin with a

marginal rate of 30%, are shown in Column 3a, while the resulting net
cash flows from the instrument-consisting of the initial outlay, six

subsequent tax payments, and the amount received at maturity, reduced by the seventh and final tax payment-are shown in Column
4a. In Column 5a each of the cash flows in Column 4a, other than the
initial outlay, has been discounted to the date of purchase, at an aftertax discount rate, on these assumptions taken to be 7%.48
Observe that the sum of the discounted values in Column 5a of the
seven net cash flows in Column 4a equals the initial outlay. That is,
the value of the asset, conceived of as the sum of the after-tax discounted values of its after-tax cash flows, equals its purchase price. Its
value has not been affected by the intervention of tax. This, then, is a
44 The system now in place was originally found in IRC § 1232A (before repeal in 1984).
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 232, 96 Stat. 324,
499-501 (adding § 1232A); see also Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,
§§ 41-43, 98 Stat. 494, 531-58 (prescribing a general recodification of the statutory provisions governing the treatment of debt instruments, as part of which pre-existing § 1232A
became what is now IRC § 1272(a)).
45 Table 2 assumes that the OID on the bond accrues and compounds annually. The
default assumption in IRC § 1272(a)(5) is of semiannual compounding; in effect, however,
an instrument subject to the OID rules must compound at least as frequently as it pays
interest. Reg. § 1.1272-1(b)(1)(ii). The default assumption reflects that debt instruments
typically provide for semi-annual coupon payments. The regulations do, however, permit
annual compounding with respect to a pure discount bond, which makes no coupon payments at all. Id.
46 IRC § 1272(a)(4).
47 IRC § 1272(a)(3). Since an instrument's compounding period (its statutory "accrual
period") need not and rarely does correspond with the holder's taxable year, and since
instruments change hands throughout the year, § 1272(a)(3) allocates the increase in the
adjusted issue price during any accrual period between taxable years and among holders
using a daily ratable methodology. IRC § 1272(a)(1), (3).
48 In a world in which investors face a pretax interest rate of 10%, a holder taxed at
marginal tax rate z = 30% on (ordinary) interest income would earn interest at an after-tax
rate of r*(1 - z) or 0.10 * 0.70 = 7%. Hence, in a taxable world, the after-tax cash flows
from a taxable investment would be discounted by a 30% bracket holder at that after-tax
rate.
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simple illustration of the Samuelson theorem,4 9 according to which the
value of an asset subject to "economic depreciation" or (what
amounts to the same thing) 50 pure accrual taxation is unaffected by
the imposition of an income tax.
As noted in Part I, two distinct effects of an income tax interact to
produce that result. One is that taxation reduces future cash flow
from the asset by the amount of the tax liabilities (a "cash flow effect"); the other is that it reduces the rate at which the after-tax cash
flows are discounted (a "discounting effect"), thereby elevating their
present values.5 1 As a rule, these two phenomena have opposing ef52
fects in their impact on asset values.
Under a pure accrual tax, however, they interact in an extraordinary way: The cash flow and discounting effects exactly offset one
53
another, and they do so in every period and at every marginal rate.
It is that exact counterbalancing that leaves the asset's value unchanged. 54 That is illustrated in the balance of Table 2. The six subsequent panels (labeled 3b-5b through 3g-5g) show tax, net cash flows,
and present values, assuming marginal rates that range from 40%70%. At each marginal rate both the after-tax cash flows and the discount rate are reduced,5 5 and the after-tax value of the asset remains
constant at $5131.58.56 That is the Samuelson theorem in a nutshell.
III.

PREFERENTIAL TAXATION OF CAPITAL INCOME

The instrument illustrated and taxed as in Table 2 offers a natural
background against which to explore the properties of preferential
taxation. Since the invariance property it exhibits is generally characteristic of assets taxed using economic accrual, it may be taken as a
proxy for the discrete time representation of any asset taxed in that
fashion. In the abstract, the pretax value of any such asset can be
represented algebraically as the sum of the present values of its constituent cash flows. If, in addition, the asset is taxed using economic
accrual, its after-tax value-that is, its after-tax cash flows, discounted
49 Samuelson, note 2, at 604.
50 Sims, note 1, at 230-33.

51 See id. at 235-36, 246-54.
52 Id.

53 Id. at 235-38, 253 tbl.4, 254 tbl.5 (illustrating that the cash flow and discounting effects
offset one another in each year).
54 See notes 35 and 48; Sims, note 1, at 246-48; Sims, note 35.
55 For a pure discount bond, after-tax cash flows, consisting (except in the final period)
entirely of tax liabilities, are reduced in that they become more negative. The discount rate
in each is instance r*(1 - z). See note 48.
56 This result holds in the presence of time-varying r and z. See note 35; Lyon, note 35;
Sims, note 35.
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at an after-tax rate-will exhibit the invariance property illustrated in
Table 2. The basic properties of preferential taxation can then be captured through simple variations, numerically rendered, introduced
into that illustration. As noted in Part I, I explore the issues separately with respect to preferential tax rates and preferential timing.
A.

PreferentialRates

Imagine, to begin with, that any part of any year's taxable income
from the instrument is for any reason taxed at a rate that is to any
extent lower than the holder's otherwise applicable marginal rate,
with every other aspect of the example unchanged. That introduces a
discrete, additional, positive cash flow, occasioned by the tax savings
attributable to the preferential rate, into a set of after-tax discounted
values that otherwise exhibit the invariance property. For the latter,
in isolation, that property will not be altered by the introduction of
additional cash flows. That is, a discrete time representation of the
value of the asset-after introducing the additional cash flow induced
by the rate preference-may be decomposed into its tax-invariant
value, plus the present value of the additional preference-induced
cash flow. As such, any variation in the value of the asset resulting
from a preferential tax rate will just be the variation in the value of
the cash flow introduced by that preferential rate.
I offer two illustrations. The first takes the form of a fixed percentage reduction in the marginal rate, applied to an arbitrary increment
of income in a single arbitrarily chosen period. At the other extreme
the second illustration taxes all income from the asset as it accrues,
but at a flat preferential rate. Although not commonly encountered,
the first was chosen for its simplicity, and because it affects the value
of the asset only through its impact on the discount rate. The second
well. 57
is more common and affects the cash flow from the asset as
57 Preferential rates can take any of several forms, in addition to the fixed reduction in
the otherwise applicable marginal rate initially illustrated here. One is a flat preferential
rate (T). See, e.g., IRC § 103 (providing a zero rate on municipal bonds); IRC § 1201(b)
(before amendment in 1969) (providing a reduced flat tax on long-term capital gain). In
such cases the preference is z - T, where z is the otherwise applicable marginal rate. Another is a fixed percentage reduction in the otherwise applicable marginal rate, equivalent
to a fixed percentage reduction in the preferentially-taxed income. See, e.g., IRC § 1202(a)
(providing a 50% deduction on gain from sale of qualified small business stock held for
more than five years); IRC § 1202(a) (before amendment in 1986) (providing a 60% deduction for noncorporate net capital gain); IRC § 613 (providing allowances for depletion
equal to percentages of income of extractive industries). Irrespective of whether the percentage reduction is applied to the preferentially-taxed income or directly to the marginal
rate, the preferential rate is z*(l - 7T), where ir is the percentage reduction in the taxable
income or the tax rate.
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A Fixed Rate Reduction
If the preference takes the form of a fixed percentage point reduction in the otherwise applicable marginal rate, the preferential tax savings and the cash flow effect of the preference will be constant across
marginal rates. Consequently, any variation, as marginal rates change,
in the value of the preference-and the asset-will be due solely to
changes in the after-tax discount rate. As with any cash flow, the after-tax present value should rise with the holder's marginal tax rate, as
the increasing tax rate reduces the after-tax discount rate. Since that
is the only element of the asset's value that varies with the tax rate,
the value of the asset as a whole, following that of the preferenceinduced cash flow, should increase with the holder's marginal rate.
To illustrate, suppose that $100 of the accrued discount in Table 2
had been taxed at a five-point rate preference, so that a holder otherwise taxed at 30% was instead taxed at 25% on that $100, just in (say)
Period 2. The effect would be to reduce tax expense, thereby raising
net revenue, by $5 in Period 2, leaving all other cash flows (and their
present values) unchanged. This, then, is a pure, isolated rate preference, uncontaminated by any preferential timing. The value of the
asset should now be just the sum of the after-tax present values of the
original, tax-rate-invariant cash flows, plus the after-tax present value
of the additional $5 tax-savings realized in Year 2.
The net effect is illustrated in Table 3.
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It is identical to Table 2, except for the 5% rate preference applied
to $100 of accrued income in Period 2, reducing tax expense (and increasing revenue) by $5, in the cell marked by an asterisk in Column
3a. What then also change are the asset's Period 2 after-tax cash flow
and its discounted value, shown in Columns 4a and 5a, likewise
marked with asterisks. As a result, the asset's aggregate present
value, reported in the final row of Column 5a, increases from its taxinvariant value of $5131.58 to $5135.95, or by $4.37. But that $4.37 is
just the present value, discounted for two years at 10*(1 - 0.30) = 7%,
of the additional $5 of tax-induced cash flow in Period 2. At a marginal rate of 40% (Panel (B)), the preferential rate is 40% - 5% = 35%,
and the cash flow effect of the preferential rate is still $5. At an aftertax discount rate of only 6%, however, the present value of that benefit (Column 5b) grows to $4.45; and, while the effects are comparably
modest, the value of the asset continues to increase with the tax rate,
to $4.71 at 70%, as reported in the final rows of Columns 5c-5g. At
each intermediate rate between 30% and 70%, the increase in the
value of the asset is just the additional $5 Period 2 cash flow, discounted for two periods at the resulting sequence of after-tax discount
rates. 58 As predicted, the observed change in the asset's value in Table 3 is just the change in the present value of the $5 cash flow, introduced by the 5% rate preference applied to $100 of income in Period
2, as the marginal rate rises and the after-tax discount rate falls. 59 So
while discounting does reduce the value of the preference, it does so
in steadily diminishing measure as the marginal tax rate goes up. In
this instance, even where the cash flow effect of the preferential rate is
constant, increases in the marginal tax rate still increase the value of
the preference, by depressing the after-tax rate at which it is discounted.
2.

A Flat PreferentialRate
Suppose, alternatively, that all income from the instrument is taxed
as it accrues in Table 2, but at a flat, 20% rate. 60 In that event the
preferential rate will have a cash flow as well as a discounting effect:
If the marginal rate is denoted by z and the flat preferential rate by -,
the preference is z - -; its cash flow effect increases dollar for dollar
with z. That is illustrated in Table 4.
58 As the tax rate approaches 100%, the after-tax discount rate approaches 0% and the
present value of the tax savings approaches $5.
59 The same experiment is carried out algebraically in Sims, note 14, where it is shown
that any rate-induced preference leads to an asset value that is strictly increasing in the
holder's marginal rate.
60 The example is not entirely far-fetched. That is more or less what we currently do
with "qualified dividends," although that treatment typically is justified on grounds that
would not be relevant here. IRC § 1(h)(11)(B).
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Columns 3 and 4 report taxes at the flat 20% rate on the accrued
gain from the asset, and the after-tax cash flows, respectively, which
are now unchanged from panel to panel; Column 5 reports their present values. Columns 6 and 7 are new: Column 6 reports the difference between the tax liabilities in Tables 2 and 4, representing the cash
flow benefits of the preferential rate; Column 7 reports their present
values.
Note, first, in Panel A of Table 4, that the value of the asset has
been elevated from $5131.58 to $5496.89, or by $365.31. Intuitively
that is because, given the flat, 20% preferential tax rate, value is accruing to the asset at 10*(1 - 0.20) = 8%, while the resulting future
cash flows are being discounted to a 30% bracket taxpayer at only
10*(1 - 0.30) = 7%. In greater detail, the aggregate undiscounted tax
liabilities ($973.68) have been reduced by 10% of the aggregate
$4868.42 increase in value, or $486.84, compared to the aggregate liabilities (at 30%) of $1460.53 in the comparable column of Table 2.
Discounted at 7% that difference in tax liabilities has an aggregate
present value of $365.31, reported in Column 5a, exactly equal to the
increase in the value of the asset. 65 Note, too, as collected in Column
6a and discounted in Column 7a, that both the benefits of the preferential rate and the present values of those benefits may be accounted
for separately from the balance of the asset. Just as in Table 3, one
can decompose the value of the asset into the tax-invariant value of its
original cash flows, reported in Table 2, and the present value of the
benefits of the preferential rate, summarized in Columns 6a and 7a of
Table 4.
Panel B of Table 4 assumes a 40% marginal rate. (Columns 1
through 4 of that table are unchanged.) Column 5b discounts the after-tax cash flows in Column 4 at 6%, producing a present value of
$5891.08, or $759.49 more than the tax-invariant value of $5131.58 in
Table 2, and $394.18 more than the value of the 10% preference at a
marginal rate of 30%. Since the reported after-tax cash flows remain
constant, it is tempting to attribute that change entirely to the difference in after-tax discount rates in Panels A and B. But to think of it
that way misses the key to this example. Compared to a 30% bracket
taxpayer, for whom in this example the sum of the undiscounted cash
flow benefits of a flat 20% rate are $486.84, the undiscounted benefits
to a 40% bracket taxpayer are twice that, or $973.68, arrayed in Column 6b. It is those increased benefits that, when discounted to preThe discounting is less straightforward than in Table 3, because the benefit of the
preferential rate is spread over seven years, and so is discounted from one to seven years.
Taking into account both the average number of years (4) and that the undiscounted benefits are increasing with time, the present value is roughly equivalent to discounting the
aggregate preferential benefit of $486.84 for 4.25 years at a 7% after-tax discount rate.
65
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sent value at 6% for between one and seven years, have a present
value of $759.49 (in Column 7b), equal to the observed increase in

value in Column 5b.
In other words, even though what is observed in Table 4 is a set of

after-tax cash flows fixed by the flat 20% preferential tax rate, discounted at rates that vary with the tax rate, the benefit of that flat rate

as the marginal rate rises has both a cash flow and a discounting component. The implicit tax savings, z - T, increase with the marginal rate,
by $486.84 to $973.68, as the marginal rate moves from 30% to 40%.
And although those tax savings (like the tax savings at 30%) continue
to be discounted, a comparison of Panels A and B of Table 4 shows
that they are discounted less heavily as the tax rate increases. So the

marginal effect of an increase in the tax rate from 30% to 40%, in the
aggregate, consists of (1) an additional 10% increase in cash flow
($486.84), plus (2) a reduction in the discount rate from 7% to 6%,

applied to all $973.68 in preferential tax savings. As such the marginal
benefit of the second 10% rate preference ($394.18) exceeds that of
the first 10% preference ($365.31).66 And, as shown in the balance of
Table 4,67 the value of the preferential rate continues to rise with the

marginal rate, reflecting in each case an additional cash flow benefit of
$486.84 plus an additional one-percentage point fall in the after-tax
rate at which all the cash flow benefits from the preferential rate are
discounted. At 70% the instrument has a value of $7273.96, $2142.38
more than its tax-invariant value. That difference consists of elevated
cash flow of (70% - 20%) = 50% of the accrued $4868.42 gain,

$2434.21, now discounted at 3%.
Both examples thus illustrate the conventional understanding that
the benefit of a preferential tax rate increases with the otherwise ap-

plicable marginal tax rate. They do so whether that increase is due
solely to its impact on the after-tax discount rate, as in Table 3, or to

both discounting and cash flow effects, as in Table

4.68

It bears under-

66 The aggregate $759.49 benefit may be decomposed into (1) the $365.31 benefit (after
discounting at 7%) from the $486.84 preference at 30%, plus (2) a $379.75 benefit from the
additional $486.84 cash flow benefit at 40%, discounted at 6%, plus (3) $14.44, the difference between the present values of $486.84 discounted at 6% and 7%. The net increase in
the benefit is the sum of (2) and (3), or $394.19.
67 The discussion in text captures the consequence of each ten-percentage point increase
in the marginal rate. Tables 2-5 also include entries for marginal rates of 45% and 55%,
which are key to the results in Table 5. They are innocuous in Tables 2 and 3 and may be
safely ignored in connection with Table 4.
68 As developed in Sims, note 14, regardless of whether a preferential rate takes the
form of a fixed percentage reduction (as in Table 3), a flat preferential rate (as in Table 4),
or a percentage reduction in the marginal rate, the first derivative with respect to the tax
rate is everywhere positive at positive tax and discount rates, indicating that the value of a
rate preference is strictly increasing in the marginal tax rate. For a preference like that
illustrated in Table 3, the derivative has a single term that captures the discounting effect of
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scoring, moreover, that in Table 4 the cash flow and discounting effects of the preferential rate operate in concert: They both function to
increase the benefit of each increase in the marginal tax rate. It is
true, as an initial matter, that discounting reduces the benefit of the
cash flow induced by a preferential rate. But each increase in the
marginal tax rate reduces the discount rate, thereby reducing the impact of discounting. So the marginal effect, on both cash flow and
discounting, of an increase in the tax rate is to increase the value of
the preferential rate, and to do so at an increasing rate. In Table 4,
that is reflected by the fact that the incremental value of each 10%
increase in the marginal tax rate grows, from $365.31 at 30% to
$497.32 at 70%.69 As developed in the next Section that proves not to
be true of preferential timing, where something quite different occurs.
B.

PreferentialTiming

Table 5 brings us to the valuation of preferential timing, and to the
central insight of this Article. Once again I begin with a simple experiment, introduced into the baseline illustration in Table 2. This time,
however, the experiment is simply to retard the timing of the taxation
of some element of income from an earlier to a later period. With no
variation in tax rates, the impact of that change will be to reduce tax
expense and increase revenue in one period, and then to make an adjustment in a later period that, on an undiscounted basis, is exactly
offsetting. As commonly characterized, it is, in effect, an interest-free
70
loan from the government.
It should be intuitively clear, as long as the marginal rate applied in
both periods is the same, that the deferral of tax to a later period and
the implicit acceleration of revenue to an earlier period will have a
positive impact on the value of the asset; the accelerated revenue, net
of the discounted subsequent adjustment, is more valuable than if the
timing had remained unchanged. What is more, as with the illustrations of preferential rates, the impact of the timing change may be
a change in the marginal rate. For those consisting of a flat preferential rate or a percentage reduction in the marginal rate, the derivative has two terms, one reflecting the cash
flow effect, and another the discounting effect. In each case, moreover, the second derivative is also positive, indicating that the magnitudes of the tax-induced effects are themselves increasing.
69 Although each $486.84 incremental cash flow benefit is discounted, eventually the
impact of reductions in the discount rate on the present values of all cash flows from the
asset, including the amount received at maturity, swamps the effect of discounting the incremental cash flow, so that the net marginal benefit of further increases in the tax rate
exceed the incremental $486.84 cash flow benefit. In Table 4 that occurs when the tax rate
increases from 60% to 70%.
70 See Halperin & Warren, note 10, at 321.
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isolated from the value of the original after-tax cash flows from the
underlying asset, which continue to exhibit tax rate invariance.
Hence, the variation in the value of the asset as a whole should again
be captured by the variation in the present values of the incremental
cash flows induced by the timing change. Compared to a preferential
rate, however, the properties of a timing change are somewhat more
complex. In exploring those properties it is useful to keep in mind
that this is not an attempt to put a value on the income deferred; what
influences value, and what is being valued, is the impact of deferral on
cash flow. 71 That impact will consist of (1) the net present value of (2)
the temporary tax savings from deferral, both of which will be affected
by the taxpayer's marginal rate.
In the concrete example found in Table 5, Table 2 has been subjected to a single, arbitrarily selected pair of changes, decreasing taxable income by $100 in Period 2, and then increasing it by $100 in
Period 6. Again assuming initially a 30% marginal rate, those changes
reduce tax expense (and increase cash flow) in Period 2 by $30, offset
by a corresponding $30 increase in tax liability (and decrease in cash
flow) in Period 6. (The cells that differ from Table 2 are again marked
with an asterisk.) At 30%, that elementary timing change elevates the
asset's value from $5131.58 to $5137.79. But that difference, $6.21, is
just the net value of a $30 cash inflow two periods from now, offset by
a $30 cash outlay four periods later, both discounted to present value
at 7%, as illustrated in (newly added) Columns 6a and 7a of Table 5.72
Thus, as in Tables 3 and 4, the value of the asset in Table 4 is just its
tax-invariant value, plus the net present value of the timing change.

See note 76.
Even more simply, the value of deferring $30 for four years at 7% is $30/1.3108
$7.11; further discounted from Year 2 to Time 0 produces $7.11/1.1449 = $6.21.
71

72
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As with Tables 2-4, the experiment in Table 5 is carried out for marginal rates between 30% and 70%. As in Table 4, an increase in the
marginal rate to 40% (Panel B) has both a cash flow and a discounting
effect. The former increases the temporary tax savings from deferral
by $10. In contrast with a preferential rate, however, the impact on
discounting of an increase in the marginal tax rate depresses the value
of preferential timing. In Table 4, each tax-induced reduction in the
discount rate elevated the present value of the cash flow produced by
the preferential rate; the cash flow and discounting effects of an increase in the marginal tax rate acted in concert to produce an increasing marginal benefit. With timing, in contrast, what is being
discounted is the repayment of the temporary savings from deferral;
discounting that repayment at a lower after-tax discount elevates its
value-the effective burden of repayment-and so reduces the value
of deferral.
In other words, where timing is concerned, the cash flow and discounting effects of an increase in the tax rate work in opposition to,
rather than in concert with, one another: The cash flow effect increases the amount of tax deferred, while valuing its repayment at a
lower discount rate reduces the beneficial impact per dollar deferred.
The first $30 of deferred tax produced a benefit of $6.21/$30, or about
$0.207 for every dollar deferred. As reported in Panel B of Table 5,
the next $10 of deferred tax inceases the net present value of deferral
73
from $6.21 to $7.40, or by $1.19/$10 = $0.119 per dollar deferred.
Consequently, while deferral in the aggregate is more valuable at 40%
than 30%, the net effect, in contrast with a preferential rate, is that the
marginal benefit of deferral is going down.
The change in the marginal benefit of deferral as the tax rate increases produces a striking outcome in the balance of Table 5. At
marginal rates of 50% and 55% the benefit of deferral continues to
rise, but by decreasing amounts, first by $0.64 to $8.04, and then of
another $0.09 to $8.13, 74 by which point the asset's value is $5139.71.
At 55%, however, the process reverses itself, and the marginal effect
becomes negative. From that point forward the asset value declines
with the tax rate, to $5139.64 and $5138.94 at 60% and 70%, respectively. The decline thereafter continues, with the value of deferral approaching zero, and the asset value approaching $5131.58, as the tax
rate approaches 100% and the after-tax discount rate approaches
73 The aggregate benefit of $7.40/$40 = $0.185/$l deferred at 40% is a weighted average
of the $0.207/$l on the first $30 of deferred tax and $0.119/$1 on the next $10: 0.75*$0.207

+ 0.25*$0.119 - $0.185.
74 Although the cash-flow effect of the increase from 50% to 55% is smaller than from

40% to 50%, the benefit per dollar deferred at 55% ($0.09/$5 = $0.018) is still less than at
50% ($0.64/$10 = $0.064).
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zero. The key entries from Table 5, including the present values of the
timing change at marginal rates from 40%-60%, are summarized in
Table 6 below.
TABLE 6
SUMMARY OF TABLE 5

(Shaded cells are maximized values)
Cash
Flow
@ 40%
Period 2
Period 6
PV =
FV

PV

40 35.600
-40 -28.198
7.401
11.129

Cash
Flow
@ 45%

PV

45 40.430
-45 -32.636
7.794
11.3

Cash
Flow
@ 50%

PV

50 45.351
-50 -37.311
8.041
11.314

Cash
Flow
@ 55%
55
-55

PV

Cash
Flow
@ 60%

50.365
-42.234
8.1
11.065

PV

60 55.473
-60 -47.419
8.054
10.599

In contrast with a pure preferential rate, then, the value of pure
preferential timing takes on a maximum at a marginal rate in the vicinity of 55%, at least if Table 5 is taken as a guide.
IV.
A.

THE VALUE OF PREFERENTIAL TIMING

The General Properties of Deferral

The identification of the valuation property of pure deferral illustrated in Table 5 is the principal contribution of this Article. 75 This
Section explores why the value of deferral behaves in that way, and
what can be said about the mechanism(s) that produce the result.
Before turning to those questions, two preliminary matters will simplify the process of tracking down answers. First, just as with rate
preferences, the observed change in the value of an asset from preferential timing is just the change in the present value of the timing preference in isolation, reported in Columns 6 and 7 and the penultimate
lines of Table 5 and summarized in Table 6. So while it was initially
useful to develop these insights in the setting of a neutrally taxed asset, that is an inessential complication with which I can (and largely
do) dispense from now on. Second, while in that setting it was useful
to illustrate deferral from one more or less arbitrarily chosen period to
another, it will further simplify matters, with no loss of generality, to
assume henceforth that deferral occurs at some initial "Time 0," and
subsists until the end of some arbitrary future "Period k."
75 As noted above and discussed more fully in Section IV.B below, a slightly different
manifestation of the same phenomenon was independently and simultaneously identified
by Peter Brady. Brady, note 15, at 3-4.
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With those understandings, and extracted from the context of an
illustration like that in Table 5, the algebraic generalization of the
model of deferral in that illustration is
(1)

z{1

(l+r[l-z])k}'

where r is the pretax interest rate, z is the marginal tax rate, and - is
the amount of income deferred. In that form, D(z) models the value
of $, deferred at Time 0, saving tax of $zE, and repaid by including $E
in income and k periods later repaying tax of $ze, with the repayment
discounted for k periods at the after-tax discount rate, r(1 - z). 7 6
1.

Why?
There are several ways of shedding light on this phenomenon. In
the setting of expression (1), much the most abstract and least intricate, as well as the most general, is this: preferential timing has a positive value for interest and tax rates that are "normal," in the sense
that they take on values between 0 and 1. That much is clear from
expression (1), and is corroborated by Table 5. Intuition tells us, on
the other hand, that tax deferral is nonexistent at a marginal rate of
0%, and in that event expression (1) equals zero. But expression (1)
also implies that the value of deferral approaches zero as the marginal
tax rate approaches 100% (that is, 1). At z = 1 the after-tax discount
rate r(1 - z) = 0%. At a zero discount rate money no longer has a time
value, so that the value of deferral is likewise zero; that, too, is reflected in expression (1), by the fact that the factor in braces takes on
the value {1 - 11 = 0 at z = 1. 77 So deferral is worth zero at marginal
76 The general version in Table 5, from which expression (1) was obtained by multiplying
it by (1 + r[1 - z]), is
D(zr)

= z

___( ____z]

(l+r[1-z])J+k}'

where deferral is measured not from 0 to k, but from period j to period j + k. In Table 5, E=
$100, j = 2, and k = 6.
There is some temptation to think about deferral simply in terms of the present value,
discounted at an after-tax discount rate, of some amount to be received in the future, in
which event the model would look like:
D(z,r) = 1+tOl-z)"
1
In that formulation the "value" of "deferral" is strictly increasing in the tax rate, just as
conventional wisdom would have it. What it misses is that it is the cash inflow in the form
of tax savings from deferral, followed by the (discounted) cash outflow from repayment,
not the deferral of income recognition itself, that affects the value of the asset.
77 Tax deferral is a creature of discounting. If the discount rate is zero-whether because the pretax interest rate is zero, or the marginal tax rate is so high that the after-tax
discount rate is near zero-deferral confers no advantage. It is probably at least in part for
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tax rates of both 0% and 100% but has positive value at marginal
rates in between. Since, moreover, expression (1) is a continuous
function of the marginal rate, 78 it follows as a mathematical matter
that it must take on a maximum value somewhere between z = 0 and z
79
= 1. Thus, although the math tells us nothing about how it all comes
about, it does say that the value of a pure timing preference, in contrast with a preferential rate, does not strictly increase with the
holder's marginal tax rate. It behaves, instead, as illustrated in Tables
5 and 6, rising first up to some point and thereafter falling back to
zero.

that reason that tax deferral has seemed a less pressing issue in recent years, when nominal
interest rates have hovered near zero.
78 That is, although, in the discounting function 1/(1 + r[1 - z])k, time (k) is discrete, the
function itself varies smoothly with z or r on the interval [0, 1]; it takes on no undefined
values in that interval and does not exhibit any "kinks" in the graph of its values. Mathematically, the discrete discounting function is "differentiable" in z (as is its continuous
counterpart, e "r1z)t).

79 The foundation for this assertion is a proposition of the differential calculus called
"Rolle's theorem." E.g., Earl Swokowski, Calculus with Analytic Geometry 132-33 (4th
ed. 1984). It requires (1) that the function be continuous and smooth (technically, "differentiable") in its arguments (r and z), in this instance in the interval (0, 1), a condition that
the discounting functions satisfy; and (2) that the function take on the same value at 0 and
1. With those conditions the theorem says that, unless the function takes on the value at its
endpoints throughout the interval-that is, it is constant-there must be at least one point
in the interval at which it achieves an "extreme value" (either a maximum or minimum).
(Sufficient conditions for the extreme value to include a maximum are that the first derivative be greater than zero (the function is increasing) at z = 0, a condition that expression
(1) satisfies; if, in addition, the second derivative is everywhere negative on (0, 1) the only
extreme value is a maximum and it is unique.)
Roughly translated, Rolle's theorem says, for a differentiable function like expression
(1), that "What goes up and then comes down again must reach a (at least one) peak
somewhere along the way."
Depending on the context, deferral can take different forms, with differing mathematical
representations. As captured by expression (1), it consists of deferred recognition of income, offset by restoration of an equal amount in some later period, without any impact on
taxation of the income from temporarily investing the tax savings from the deferral. This is
characteristic of deferral attributable to accelerated depreciation (or expensing) of durable
assets, or nonqualified deferred compensation when the amount restored to income is not
adjusted for the passage of time; it is often characterized as equivalent to an interest-free
loan from the government. A second version consists of deferral of investment income
attributable to an otherwise tax-paid investment, as is true of market discount bonds (IRC
§ 1276) and nonqualified deferred annuities (IRC § 72(e)). A third consists of both deferred initial recognition of income, and of the earnings from investing the income taxation
of which has been deferred, as is true of traditional funded, qualified deferred compensation. E.g., IRC §§ 219(a), 408(e)(1). See notes 124 and 127. The last of these is investigated in Subsection IV.B.3; the second is analyzed in Part V. Each such representation,
however, satisfies the conditions that (1) its value is zero at either extreme of the rate
schedule, and (2) it is increasing at z = 0 and decreasing at z = 1. See Sims, note 14.
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How?

That leaves to be explained just how this all comes about, and
whether it is possible to identify precisely the marginal rate that maximizes the value of deferral. As a formal matter what is illustrated in
Table 5 is a solution to the problem of maximizing the value of a pure
timing preference, modelled generally in expression (1), by varying
the holder's marginal rate. In a sufficiently cooperative world one
would be able to solve that problem explicitly, and from the solution
to obtain insights into what produces these results.8 0 As simple as it
appears, however, expression (1) does not as a rule admit of an exact
(or "closed-form") solution,81 so one is left to draw more indirect inferences about its behavior as the tax rate changes. Even so, there are
in principle more ways to proceed than just one.
Of the available possibilities, what seems the most intuitively accessible separates expression (1) into its two constituent terms, each expressed as a function of the tax rate, which (setting E= 1) I denote by
v(z) = z, and b(z) = -z/(1 + r[1 - z])k. The first, v(z), is the value

realized at Time 0, consisting of the undiscounted tax savings from
deferring $1 at marginal rate z; it is linear, increasing with z at constant rate 1, taking on values between 0 and 1. The second, b(z), represents the burden of repayment from including $1 in income at the
end of Period k, consisting of tax on the restored income at marginal
rate z, discounted to present value for k periods at the after-tax discount rate r(1 - z). s2 It is decreasing (becoming more burdensome) in
z, from zero at z = 0 (there is no tax and hence no deferred tax to be
repaid), to -1 at z = 1 (the after-tax discount rate is 0%, so the burden
of repayment is just its undiscounted value). Of equal importance, in
contrast with the initial benefit from deferring the tax payment, the
burden of repayment is nonlinear, having a shallow negative slope in
the neighborhood of z = 0, that becomes steeper, at an increasing rate,
as the marginal tax rate goes up. The decomposition of the deferral
function D(z) into v(z) and b(z) is illustrated in Figure 1.8 3
80 To do so one would differentiate expression (1) with respect to the tax rate, set the
derivative equal to zero, and solve the resulting equation to obtain an expression for the
value-maximizing marginal rate z*.
81 In very limited circumstances it does. One example may be found in the text and note
at note 115. Another is the preferentially-taxed version of the discount bond illustrated in
Table 12, analyzed in Part V.B. See Sims, note 14.
82 The principal alternative is to separate expression (1) into two factors, consisting of
z-the cash flow effect of deferral-and everything else, {1 - 1/(1 + r[1 - z])k}-the discounting effect. See text and notes 9-10. In some ways factoring expression (1) is analytically more informative than separating it into its benefit and repayment terms, but the
properties of the latter are easier to depict and explain.
83 The illustrated decomposition is for $100 (rather than $1) deferred for ten years at
10%, with the duration of deferral selected to produce a plot whose features are suffi-
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FIGURE 1
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At any marginal rate the value of D(z) is just the sum of the constituent functions, v(z) and b(z), so its value is zero at z = 0 or z = 1.
More informatively, at any marginal tax rate the rate of change of
b(z). 84
D(z), given by its slope, is just the sum of the slopes of v(z) and
With that understanding it is possible to show why the slope of D(z) is
positive, and the value of deferral is increasing, in the vicinity of z = 0:
In that neighborhood, the benefit of deferral, given by the slope of
v(z), is increasing faster than the burden of repayment, given by the
slope of b(z), is decreasing (that is, becoming more burdensome); the
positive slope of v(z) is greater in magnitude than the (absolute value
is positive. 85
of) the negative slope of b(z), so the slope of D(z) overall
ciently pronounced to be-easy to interpret. The value of deferral is maximized at around z
= 56%.
84 Since by construction D(z) = v(z) + b(z) is just a polynomial in z, the slope of D(z),
given by its first derivative, is just D' (z) = v'(z) + b'(z), the sum of the derivatives of its
constituent terms.
85 The function v(z) = z is just a straight line with a slope of +1; the function b(z) = -z/(l
+ r[1 - z])k, is a curve, the slope of which is everywhere negative; more particularly it can be

< shown that (1) at z = 0 its slope is -1/(1 + r)k > -1, and (2) that at z = 1 its slope - (1 + kr)

1. That is, though of opposite signs, the positive slope of the benefit function v(z) is
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Those relationships may readily be visualized in Figure 1, where in the
vicinity of zero the benefit of deferring the tax payment is clearly increasing more steeply than the burden of repayment is falling. The
fact that at low marginal rates the benefit of deferring the tax payment
outweighs the burden of subsequently repaying it is the key to the fact
that deferral initially takes on positive values. By the same token, it
may be shown that the slope of D(z) is negative in the vicinity of z = 1
because, in that neighborhood, the (negative) burden of repayment
has steepened to that point at which it is growing more rapidly than
the benefit of deferring the tax is increasing. Since the slope of b(z)
varies smoothly between (at z = 0) -1/(1 + r)k > -1 > -(1 + kr) (at z = 1),
at some point in that interval it must take on the value -1. At that
point both the marginal benefit of deferral and the burden of repayment are changing at exactly the same rate, but in opposite directions;
at that point D(z) takes on its maximum value: It ceases to grow, and
begins to decline, as illustrated by the plot of D(z) in Figure 1. That is
one way of visualizing and understanding why the value of deferral
changes with the marginal tax rate in the manner that it does, as summarized in Table 5, and illustrated in Figure 1.86
B.

Variation in Parametersand Perspective

Pure preferential timing arises (or has arisen) in many corners of
the income tax, from the taxation of annuities 87 and the treatment of
debt instruments8 8 to the expensing of long-lived depreciable assets,8 9
and the taxation of qualified deferred compensation. 90 While deferral
seems reflexively to be treated as a more or less unified phenomenon,
there are differences in the details of how deferral manifests itself in
differing contexts, and they do not appear to be mathematically identical; as far as I can tell no single model of preferential timing can
account for the all the variations. 91 But, at least as far as I have been
steeper than the negative slope of the repayment function b(z) at z = 0, so that the value of
deferral is increasing in that neighborhood. Conversely, the positive slope of v(z) is shallower than that of the repayment function b(z) at z = 1, so in that neighborhood the burden of repayment is increasing faster than the value of deferral, and the net value of
deferral is falling.
86 Decomposing D(z) by factoring it into its cash flow and discounting components
would look different than Figure 1, but the plot of D(z) itself would be unchanged. See
note 82.
87 IRC § 72(b), (e).
88 IRC § 1272(a); see note 12.
89 IRC §§ 179, 168(k).
90 See, e.g., IRC §§ 219, 408(e)(1).
91See note 79. Recently Halperin & Warren, note 10, have taken steps toward identifying different species of deferral, which they identify as "pure" and "counterparty" deferral,
but until recently little effort has gone into distinguishing among the variations.
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able to determine, they all share the same basic properties illustrated
in Table 5, modelled by expression (1), and shown in Figure 1: They
all have the same value (typically zero) at marginal rates of 0 and 1;
they all take on positive values at marginal rates below 1; they all can
92
be shown to be increasing at z = 0 and decreasing at z = 1; and, since
must take on a maxithey all vary continuously with the tax rate, they
93
between.
in
rate
marginal
mum value at some
To investigate in detail each of the common settings in which deferral arises would be a project all its own. It is nevertheless both possible and useful to explore what happens with variations in either the
parameter values of or the perspective on deferral, just within (or at
least near) the confines of expression (1). The first of those exercises
leads naturally to the second, and to a comparison of the findings reof
ported in this Article with those of the one other published work
94
deferral.
of
properties
valuation
the
study
which I am aware to
Variation in the Discounting Parameters

1.

Timing in taxation is just an exercise in discounting. As such, the
key parameters across the range of settings in which it arises are the
discount rate (r) and duration (in expression (1), k). A key feature of
Table 5 is that deferral takes on its maximum value at a marginal rate
in the vicinity of 55%. It is natural to ask how, if at all, and if so, to
what extent, the value-maximizing rate varies with those parameters.
The answer is to some extent suggested by Figure 2, which plots D(z)
and its components when the duration of deferral has been extended
from ten to twenty-one years.95 With that change the value-maximizing marginal rate rises from about 55% to a little over 60%, suggesting
that it might more generally rise with increasing duration (or higher
interest rates).

That is, their first derivatives are greater than zero at z = 0 and less than zero at z = 1.
See notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
Brady, note 15.
95Any analysis of the effect of altering the duration of deferral carries over naturally to
reducing or increasing the discount rate. In discrete time the discounting parameters r and
k enter the present and future value functions almost symmetrically, in that they both
affect those values in roughly the same way. Any asymmetry is due to the discretization of
the functions: In continuous time (e and e ), r and tenter symmetrically.
92

93
94
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The properties suggested by Figures 1 and 2 are more fully depicted
in the three-dimensional surface plot of expression (1) in Figure 3,
where the value of deferral is on the vertical axis, the tax rate varies
from 0% to 100% across the horizontal axis, and the duration of
deferral recedes along the perspective axis, from 0 to as many as 100
years. Each horizontal tracing across that surface depicts the value of
96
deferral at a particular duration; the tracings corresponding to Figure 1 (ten years) and (approximately) Figure 2 (twenty years), as well
as the marginal rates at which they attain their maxima, are specifically identified in Figure 3. An inspection of that surface indicates
that the rate at which value is maximized increases monotonically,
moving horizontally rightward to increasing value-maximizing marginal tax rates as the duration of deferral is prolonged, reaching 78% at
the highest illustrated duration of 100 years.
Figure 3 suggests that the marginal rate at which deferral is maximized approaches 100% as the duration of deferral becomes long.
That, in fact, is the case. The value-maximizing marginal rate turns
out to be strictly increasing in duration, beginning near (but never
quite as low as) 50% at short duration (or very low discount rates),
97
and approaching a limiting value of 100%. That property has a natural, intuitive interpretation: As the value-maximizing marginal rate
approaches 100%, the value of deferral is strictly increasing in marginal rates below it. In that event the valuation characteristics of preferential timing take on an appearance much like what was observed
with preferential rates; across the span of the rate schedule from 0%
to (nearly) 100% the value of deferral will strictly increase with the
tax rate. Put differently, as the discounting horizon becomes long, and
repayment of the deferred tax becomes increasingly remote, the present value of the burden of repayment approaches zero, and what
started out as deferral begins to look like a permanent exemption
from tax, equivalent to a preferential rate of 0%. For all practical
purposes, the value of deferral, like a preferential rate, will be strictly
increasing across the entire range of marginal tax rates as the valuemaximizing rate approaches 1.98 So it is intuitively appealing to find
that the value-maximizing rate does indeed approach 1 as the discounting horizon becomes long.
96 The horizontal lines across the surface of Figure 3 are spaced at five-year intervals;
each is a deferral curve like those plotted in Figures 1 and 2.
97 That is formally established in Sims, note 14, where it is shown that, when deferral is
evaluated in terms of its present value, the value-maximizing marginal rate is (1) strictly
more than 50% percent, and (2) approaches 100% as the horizon increases without limit.
Some intuition for this behavior is found in Section 1V.C.
98 1 thank Jake Brooks for suggesting this bit of intuition.
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Table 5, and the associated Figures 1-3, then, illustrate the basic
properties of preferential timing identified in this Article. They capture what happens when the timing of income from property varies
from accrual, as the Samuelson theorem otherwise would require. If
the timing change is beneficial, the present value of the change will
increase up to a marginal rate in excess of 50% (and for normal discounting parameters, typically around 55%-60%). After that it begins
to decline. 99 And in theory at least, the marginal rate at which value is
maximized is strictly increasing in the duration of deferral.
2.

The Impact of Temporal Perspective

When using time-adjusted values to compare matters of financial
interest, it is rarely of consequence whether the comparison is carried
out using present or future values, or values somewhere in between.
We reflexively tend to use whatever temporal perspective falls most
naturally to hand. When comparing, for example, competing investments using net present value, the comparison is by assumption made
from the perspective of "today." On the other hand, when considering how much to save for a college education, or for income replacement in retirement, it is natural to think in terms of the amount
required (or desired) in the future, so the comparison is typically carried out from the perspective of "tomorrow." Indeed the very process

of computing present or future values consists at bottom of establishing equivalence between values realized at different moments in time,
irrespective of which moment in particular is chosen for comparison. 1°° So it is unusual to expect that financial data consistently ana-

lyzed using future values will somehow yield a different answer to a
question of interest than exactly the same data analyzed in present
value.
99 Although it does not bear going into here, it may also be shown that these properties
are symmetric, in that capital income subject to a disadvantageous timing change behaves
in the opposite way, declining below its pretax (or tax-invariant) value as the tax rate rises
above 0%, eventually returning to zero as the marginal rate approaches 1. The tax legislative process being what it is, the Code contains relatively few examples of disadvantageous
timing, although they are not entirely unknown. The ratable accrual of OID between 19691982, still enshrined in § 1272(b), exemplifies it. It remained on the books until replaced
by what is now § 1272(a), after the world figured out how to take advantage of the ratable
accrual rule and the lockstep accrual of income to the holder and interest deductions to the
issuer of OID debt. New OID debt appeared in the late 1970's, issued by taxable corporate issuers for sale to exempt pension trusts and other tax-indifferent parties, at which
point Congress responded by enacting what is now § 1272(a). See Sims, note 12, at 322-23.
In the context of expression (1), disadvantageous timing could be represented by simply
reversing the signs on the two terms: Accelerated detriment now, followed by discounted
benefit later.
100 Berk & DeMarzo, note 9, at 98-109.
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The value of preferential timing seems to be an exception. The only
other study of which I am aware of the phenomena described in this
Article, prepared by Peter Brady for the Investment Company Institute, looks at the tax benefits of qualified deferred compensation, il1° 1 Brady's
lustrated through Roth and conventional IRAs.
conclusions are in part similar to, but in some particulars seem diametrically opposed to, the findings documented here. The principal
discrepancy is that Brady finds that the present value of the tax benefits of deferred compensation are maximized at a marginal rate below
50%, and that the maximizing rate decreases as the discounting horizon grows longer. 10 While it does not seem plausible that so stark a
difference in findings could turn on whether the effects of deferral are
03
being analyzed using future rather than present values, exactly that
turns out to be the case.
While that claim can be documented using expression (1), Table 5,
and the associated figures, it is useful to begin with qualified deferred
compensation, the setting in which Brady developed his findings,
which differs in detail from the model of deferral in expression (1). To
that end, I begin by describing and then illustrating the benefits of
traditional and Roth IRAs (or other qualified, funded, deferred compensation arrangements), compared to a conventionally-taxed financial investment. I start with the simplest discounting assumptions,
involving just one or two periods. What is found in such elementary
settings will carry over to the more general representation of deferral

like that in expression (1).104
105
Qualified Deferred Compensation (Conventional). I start with a

pretax wage of $W, dedicated to saving for the future. If invested in a
traditional individual retirement account (or contributed by an employer or via salary reduction to, for example, a 401(k) plan), the contribution will be deducted (or the wage excluded) from income, in
either event allowing the entire pretax $W to be contributed to the
account. If invested for one year at rate r, the account balance will
grow to $W(1 + r), and if left on deposit will not be taxed, since the
16
retirement account is itself tax-exempt. 0 If, however, the account
101Brady, note 15.
102 Id. at 28.
103 So far as I am aware, Brady would not agree with the claim that present values are
maximized at rates above 50%, since he presents his own conclusions in terms of the present values of revenue loss to the government and the benefit of deferral to the taxpayer.
Brady, note 15, expressions (9)-(12'). But his contrary conclusion is based on the use of
pretax rather than after-tax discount rates. See note 123 below.
104 For suggesting an example along the lines of what immediately follows, I thank Louis
Kaplow.
105See, e.g., IRC §§ 219, 62(a)(7), 408(e)(1), 408(d)(1).
106 Id.
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balance is withdrawn, it will (since that balance is entirely pretax) all
be taxed as ordinary income at rate z, leaving the account holder with
$W(1 + r)(1 - Z). 1 0 7 The tax treatment consists entirely of deferral.

Roth.10 8 In contrast, contributions to a Roth IRA are nondeduct-

ible and are therefore contributed tax-paid;10 9 as with the conventional IRA, however, the account itself is tax-exempt; 110 but, in

contrast with the conventional IRA, investment returns are permanently exempt from tax.'

So if the same $W were allocated to a

Roth IRA, the after-tax contribution would be $W(1 - z); if invested

for a year it will grow to $W(1 - z)(1 + r), all of which will be available
to the beneficiary. In contrast with the deferral available through a
conventional IRA, the Roth IRA confers an exemption for the wage-

earner's investment return.112

Despite those differences, as indicated by the expressions above
and is more generally well known, the two accounts, with some limit-

ing assumptions, offer equivalent tax benefits.,1 1 3 Under either a conventional or Roth deferred compensation plan, the beneficiary is left
with:
W (1 - z)(1 + r),

in the former case because the beneficiary was taxed only on withdrawal, and in the latter because only the wage was taxed, and only at
the time of receipt. And if, more generally, the balance was left in the
107

108
109
110
111

IRC § 408(d)(1).
IRC § 408A(a), (c)(1), (d)(1).
IRC § 408C(c)(1).
IRC § 408(a).

IRC § 408A(d).
Halperin & Warren, note 10, at 324-26.
113 See note 27; see also Brown, note 27, at 309-10 (originating the insight). The principal assumptions are that tax rates are identical at the time of contribution and withdrawal,
and the availability of identical investments inside the two accounts. In practice the two
are not strictly identically treated, in that most defined contribution plans are subject to
fixed limitations on contributions that do not distinguish between conventional and Roth
variants. Since a Roth IRA is funded with tax-paid dollars, while distributions from a
conventional IRA carry with them an implicit tax liability, a Roth IRA is implicitly entitled
to higher funding than a conventional IRA. See IRC §§ 408A(c)(1), 408(d)(1).
The suggestion that the value of the exclusion for investment income conferred by a
Roth IRA is strictly increasing with the marginal tax rate ignores that the earnings on
which tax is deferred are funded out of tax-paid wages, the very foundation for the algebraic proposition that Roth and conventional accounts confer equivalent benefits. It is
precisely the taxation of the wage when received, or the account balance when withdrawn,
but not both, in either event compared to conventional taxation of both wages and investment returns, that produces the benefit of deferral. The treatment of both is similar
though not identical to the model of deferral in expression (1), and in any event shares
with that model the essential attributes of deferral identified above. See notes 76-78 and
accompanying text.
112
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account for k periods before withdrawal, the beneficiary would in either event receive
(2)

W(1 - z) (1 + r)k

Conventional Taxation. Expression (2) describes the outcome from
$W received and invested through either a Roth or conventional IRA.
It does not, however, capture the tax benefit of either account. That
requires a comparison of the outcome using the tax-favored account
with the conventional treatment of the same events, which would tax
both the wage on receipt and the investment return. The outcome
after conventional taxation is
(3)

W(1 - z) (1 + r [1 - z])k

entirely tax paid and available for withdrawal by the beneficiary.
The Benefit of Deferred Compensation. With those preliminaries
the benefit of deferred compensation is the difference between preferential and conventional taxation
W(1 - z)(1 + r)k - W(1 - z)(1 + r[1 - z])k

(4)

=W(j- z)f(l+ r)k- (1 + r[l-z])k}.

For our one period (k = 1) investment the benefit of either Roth or
conventional deferred compensation is thus
(5)

W(1 - z){(1 + r) - (1 + r[1 - z])) = Wrz(1 - z).

Expression (5) describes that benefit in terms of its value at the
time of withdrawal. Its present value, discounted for one year at an
after-tax discount rate r(1-z), is
(6)

Wrz(1-z)
[1+r[1-z]]"

This one-period instance of the benefit of deferred compensation,
given generally by expression (4), has quite special properties that for
our purposes make it an almost ideal point of departure. For one
thing, when k = 1, the model is identical to the general model of deferral developed in Sections III.B and IV.A. 114 What is more, in future
value (expression (5)), it is a simple parabola with roots at z = 0 and z
114

Setting e and k both equal to one in expression (1), yields
1
D(z) = z {~=
1
(t+r~-'])}

-

rzOl-z)

(lr1-zl)'

identical to Expression (6), with W = 1. Multiplying it by [1 + r(1 - z)] produces the future
value version expression (5).
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= 1, for which the value of z at which it attains a maximum may explicitly be found to be z = 1/2.115 So, in this one instance, the value of
deferral is symmetric on the interval of tax rates, 116 attaining its maximum value at exactly 50%. It therefore provides a neutral background against which to explore what happens (a) when discounting is
introduced, and (b) when deferral is prolonged for more than one
period.
This one period example is numerically illustrated in Table 7, assuming $W = $100. For the conventionally-taxed savings the wage and
investment earnings are taxed as received or accrued; for the conventional IRA nothing is taxed until withdrawn; for the Roth IRA the
wage is taxed on receipt but there is no further taxation. The outcomes are illustrated for marginal rates from 48% to 52%.
Observe, first, that whether conventionally (line 5) or preferentially
(fine 8) taxed, the after-tax wage plus investment return is declining in
the marginal tax rate. In contrast, as predicted by expression (5), the
value of the difference between conventional and preferential taxation, through either the Roth or conventional IRA, attains a maximum of $2.50 at a marginal rate of 50%. That value is also symmetric
around 50%: It is $2.4990 at both 49% and 51%, and $2.4960 at both
48% and 52%.
The Impact of Discounting and Duration. In the final line of Table
7, the values of deferral at each marginal rate have been discounted
for one period, in each case at r(1 - z). The discounting is less steep at
a marginal tax rate of 51% (and a 4.9% after-tax discount rate), than
at 50% (and a 5% after-tax discount rate). The tax-induced change in
the discount rate is such that the present value of the $2.50 undiscounted maximum, $2.3810, is less than the present value of the
$2.4990 undiscounted value of deferral at 51%, which discounts to
$2.3823. In present instead of future value, the value of deferral is
maximized at 51% rather than at 50%. So the mere process of discounting-at an after-tax discount rate-a tax benefit that otherwise
would be maximized at 50% maximizes the present value of the identical benefit at a higher marginal rate.

115 The first derivative is r(1 - 2z). Setting that equal to zero and solving for z produces
z* = 1/2. The derivative is r > 0 at z = 0 and r* (1 - z) = -r < 0 at z = 1, so the expression is
increasing at z = 0 and decreasing at z = 1, satisfying the general characteristics of a deferral function described in note 79.
116 Since variation in the value of deferral (just scaled by the constants r and W) is z(1 z), that value is identical at every convex pair of tax rates, z and 1 - z. It is, for example,
0.09 at both z = 0.10 and z = 0.90, 0.21 at z = 0.3 and z = 0.7, 0.24 at z = 0.40 and z = 0.60,
and attains a maximum of 0.25 at z = 0.50, as illustrated in Table 7.
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Table 8 extends the horizon by one period. In future value the benefit of deferral is now maximized at 49%, not 50%. Merely extending
the horizon by a single period has depressed the marginal tax rate at
which the future value of deferral is maximized below 50%, consistent
with Brady's conclusions.117 On the other hand, discounting those
same benefits for the same two periods once again elevates the tax
rate that maximizes their present value, this time from 51% to 52%.
What these elementary examples, summarized in Table 9, suggest is
this: (1) When expressed in future value, as is natural when evaluating
the benefits of deferred compensation, the value of deferral is maximized at 50% if it is for just one period, with the value-maximizing
marginal rate declining as the discounting horizon is extended beyond
one; 1 8 but (2) when expressed in present rather than future values, as
would be most natural when evaluating prospective investments, the
benefit is maximized at marginal rates strictly above 50%, and increasing with the discounting horizon,11 9
TABLE 9
SUMMARY OF TABLES

7

AND

8

0.48

0.49

0.50

0.51

0.52

FV
Discount
PV

2.4960
1.0520
2.3726

2.4990
1.0510
2.3777

Z 00
1.0500
2.3810

2.4990
1.0490
2. 1823

2.4960
1.0480
2.3817

FV
Discount
PV

5.3714
1.1067
4.8535

5i7 5
1.1046
4.8663

5.3750
1.1025
4.8753

5.3704
1.1004
4.8804

5.3614
1.0983
4 8S]5

One-Year

Two-Year

Those tentative inferences are underwritten by the more general
model of deferral in expression (1). Return first to Table 5 (or Table
6). The final line in the panel for each marginal rate reports the future
value, as of the end of Year 7, of the benefit of the timing change in
that panel, computed using an after-tax discount rate appropriate to
the marginal tax rate. Of interest are the entries at marginal rates of
45% and 55%. In present value, the benefit of deferral attained a
maximum at 55%. As suggested by Tables 7 and 8, however, the corresponding future values in Table 5 attain their maximum at 45%.
117 Brady,

note 15, at 28.

118 See expression (5).
119 See expression (6).
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Turning next to expression (1), and modifying it to capture the benefit of deferral as of the end of Period k,120 when the amount deferred
is restored to income, it becomes
Df(z) = zE {(1 + r[1 - z])'- 11.

Setting E= 1, one can decompose D'(z) into vF(z) = z(1 + r[1 - Z])k
and bF(z) = -z. Now the burden of repayment at the end of Period k is
linear and decreasing (becoming more burdensome) with z at rate -1.
The benefit of deferral, on the other hand, consisting of compound
interest at rate r(1 - z), is now nonlinear, having a slope greater than
+1 in the vicinity of z = 0 and declining thereafter with z. Figures 4
and 5 illustrate the decomposition of DF(z), on the same financial assumptions used to illustrate the present value decomposition D(z) in
Figures 1 and 2, at (as there) durations of ten years and twenty-one
years, respectively.
FIGURE

4

Future Value of Deferral ($100, @ 10%, 1OYrs):
FV Benefit - Repayment (D/z) = v/z) + b(z))
100.000
80.000
60.000

/Maximum

40.000
60.000

at z = 44%Mm

""....."

.0.000 ...................

ZU.UUU

-0.000
2

-

~.-20.000
>

40.O000--

-60.000

-

-80.000

-100.000

-FV
Marginal Tax Rate

Benefit vf(z)

--- Repayment bf(z)
--- F Value: Df(z) = vf(z) + bf(z)
...... P Value = D(z) = v(z) + b(z)

120 Expression (7) is obtained from expression (1) by multiplying by (1 + r[1 - z])k.
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FIGURE
FUTURE VALUE OF DEFERRAL

5
($100, @ 10%, 21YRS):

FV BENEFIT - REPAYMENT (Drz) = vf(z) + baz))
150.000

100.000

50.000

t

0.000

-50.000

-100.000

Marginal Tax Rate

---

FV Benefit vf(z)
Repayment bf(z)

--F Value: Df(z) = vf(z) + bf(z)
...... P Value = Ben - PVRepay

Once again otherwise identical examples, illustrated in future rather
than present value, attain their maximum values at marginal rates below 50%. The value-maximizing tax rate is about 44% in Figure 4,
and about 36% in Figure 5.121 Once again, when the benefit of deferral is expressed in future value, the value-maximizing marginal rate
becomes lower at longer durations. The same relationships are illustrated more generally in Figures 6 and 7, which are again surface plots
of the future and present values of deferral at marginal rates of 0%100%, and durations ranging from zero to twenty years. 122 The surface in Figure 6 depicts that the future value of deferral, as given by
expression (7), is maximized at marginal rates at or below 50%, with
the value-maximizing marginal rate decreasing in the duration of
121 For ease of comparison the plots of D(z) in present value from Figures 1 and 2 have
been included in Figures 4 and 5, respectively.
122 The discounting horizon has been reduced from 100 to 20 years in Figure 6; the impact of a 100-year horizon on future values is so pronounced that using that horizon in
Figure 6 would produce an uninformative plot. A twenty-year horizon was chosen to
match the illustrations in Figures 4 and 5. For comparison with Figure 6, Figure 7 depicts a
deferral surface in present value that also uses a twenty-year horizon, matching the illustrations in Figures 1 and 2.
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deferral. The surface in Figure 7 illustrates that the present value of
deferral is maximized at marginal rates above 50%, with the valuemaximizing marginal rate increasing in the duration of deferral. Reconciling the results reported here with those obtained by Brady
123
proves to be no more (or less) complicated than that.
FIGURE 6
Future Value of Deferral
($100, @ 10%, 1-20 Years)
Maximum at z = 36%
(20 Years)
100.00
90.00
80.00

Maximum at z = 44%
(10Years)

70.00
60.00
50.00 $$ Value of Deferral
40.00
30.00
20.00

20

Number of Years Deferred 15

10.00

o

00.00

d

0

'

6

6

d"

Marginal Tax Rate

123 Brady, note 15, at 28. This is not, I emphasize, a proposition with which Brady would
agree, or what he actually says. His account of the variation in the benefits of deferred
compensation as a function of the marginal tax rate is captured graphically in his Figure 8,
which depicts that the maximum is in all instances achieved at a marginal rate below 50%,
declining with the duration of deferral, and expressly recites that what it illustrates is the
"present value of the revenue cost and tax benefit of a onetime deferral of $1 of compensation." Id. at 20 fig. 8 (emphasis omitted). Brady's claim appears to stem from his discounting both the future revenue loss to the government and the benefit of deferral to the
taxpayer at pretax discount rates. See Brady, note 15, at 39-40, expressions (9)-(12). Discounting the array of after-tax benefits at discount rates that do not vary with tax rates
amounts, for a given duration of deferral, to multiplying the future value of deferral at
every marginal rate by a constant, which preserves both the contour of the deferral function and the value-maximizing marginal rate. That analytic step is unjustified. The discount rates faced by private taxpayers (unless they happen to be "tax-indifferent") are
reduced by and vary with their marginal tax rates. When that detail is introduced into
Brady's calculations, the resulting transformation leads to the present value of deferral
being maximized at marginal rates above 50%, increasing with either the pretax interest
rate or the duration of deferral, as illustrated here (and in Tables 10 and 11 in Part V).
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7
Present Value of Deferral
($100, @ 10%, 0-20 Years)
FIGURE

100.00
90.00

Maximum atz= 60%
(20 Years)

80.00
Maximum atz= 56%
(10 Years)

70.00
60.00
50.0

$,$Value of Deferral

40.00
30.00
20.00

20

Number of Years Deferred

15

101000

000
6

o0
Marginal Tax Rate

The Value of Pure Timing Preferences
The insights suggested by expressions (1) and (7), and illustrated
collectively by Figures 1-7, succinctly stated, are these:
(1) In contrast with preferential rates, the value of pure preferential timing-tax deferral-whether expressed in present or future values, does not increase monotonically with the marginal tax rate. It
achieves a maximum at some marginal rate strictly between 0% and
100%, which, on typical assumptions about discounting parameters,
falls in the general vicinity of 50%.
(2) When expressed in present values, the value of deferral is maximized at a marginal rate greater than 50%, with the value-maximizing
marginal rate increasing with the duration of deferral (or the interest
rate, or both).
(3) When expressed in future values, the value of deferral is maximized, at a marginal rate of 50% or less, with the value-maximizing
marginal rate decreasing with the duration of deferral (or the interest
rate, or both).
From a technical perspective that is pretty much the end of the
story. What is missing, however, is any intuitive account of why the
benefits of deferral should behave so differently, depending on
whether they are expressed in present or future values. What I have
to suggest is this. When stated in present values, the value of deferral,
realized at Time 0, is undiscounted; the higher the tax rate, the greater
the benefit that is realized now. On the other hand, at higher tax rates
repayment of the deferred taxes will be discounted less heavily, and
they will therefore be more burdensome to repay. But that increased
burden will be mitigated as the period of deferral is prolonged: The
C.
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farther into the future repayment is delayed the less burdensome discounting that payment at a low after-tax discount rate will be. Hence,
the longer the deferral, the less a reduced after-tax discount rate detracts from the net value of deferral, and the greater the contribution
to that value of a high marginal rate, with its high upfront tax savings.
As the discounting horizon becomes longer, the immediate tax savings
from an elevated tax rate loom larger, and the deferred repayment
looms smaller, however reduced the after-tax discount rate might be.
As the horizon is prolonged the overall value of deferral, taking into
account both, is maximized at an increasing marginal rate.
The converse is true when deferral is evaluated from the standpoint
of tomorrow. A lower marginal rate does produce a smaller initial tax
benefit. But the longer the period of accumulation, the more the after-tax rate of interest contributes to the future value of deferral. So
as the horizon becomes longer it is increasingly optimal to give up tax
savings today in return for an increased rate of return over the long
haul. Taking both into account, as the horizon becomes longer the
benefit of a higher after-tax interest rates looms larger than the reduced initial benefit from deferral, and the value of deferral is maximized at a declining marginal rate.
V.

IMPLICATIONS

This Article is principally about the value of preferential timing in
the abstract. From a practical perspective, when considered in future
value, it may be viewed as describing the accumulations not only
under qualified deferred compensation, explored in Part IV, but also
under other preferentially-taxed savings vehicles such as nonqualified

deferred compensation and deferred annuities. 124 When considered
in present value, it can be viewed as describing assets subject to preferential timing, such as market discount bonds or assets subject to
faster than economic depreciation. In this Part I take up some practical aspects and possible policy implications of the basic insights developed in Part IV. The thoughts I offer are tentative; their provisional
nature is occasioned by the complexity of the relationships involved.
Even in the simpler case (at least comparatively speaking) of accumulations under preferentially-taxed savings arrangements, the implications are not entirely straightforward. Where asset pricing is
concerned, matters are substantially more complex.
124 What is characterized in Part IV as "pure deferral" is algebraically identical to nonqualified deferred compensation, at least when the amount deferred is not adjusted for
time, and is analogous to an interest-free loan from the federal government. See notes 79
and 127.
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A.

Accumulated Tax-Favored Savings

To illustrate, it is useful to return to the basic example from Parts IIIII, characterized there as $5131.58 invested to earn compound inter-

est at 10% pretax, as elaborated in Table 2. If one thinks of that now
as a deposit to a nonqualified deferred annuity contract that is to be

surrendered in seven years, the periodic increases in the contract's
125 So the pretax
surrender value will not be taxed as they accrue.
value at the time of surrender should be $10,000, the same as the redemption price of the bond in Table 2, and the difference between

that amount and the original "investment in the contract" is included
in gross income at that time.' 26 Taxation of the investment income
generated by the contract is thereby deferred from the time it accrues
until surrender. As with the examples in Part IV,127 the benefit of
deferral is the difference between the terminal value of the contract
assuming interest had been taxed as it accrued, and its value after surrender and taxation of the gain on the contract at that time. That
treatment is illustrated in Table 10. The dollar difference between deferred and accrual taxation is reported in line 9, with the preceding

entries reporting the calculations of the after-tax accrued and realized
changes in value, for marginal rates now ranging between 40% and
85%.128

See IRC § 72(e). Nonqualified deferred annuities may be converted into a stream of
annuity payments, but they may also be surrendered in return for a lump sum instead.
They enjoy preferential tax treatment to the extent thay are used to meet long-term savings
objectives. As such, they are subject to an addition to tax (essentially a deferral charge)
under § 72(q) when surrendered "prematurely." The illustration to follow assumes that no
such supplementary charge applies.
126 IRC § 72(e)(2)-(5).
127 They do differ in technical detail. When described algebraically what are characterized in Part IV as pure deferral, on the one hand, and deferral via funded qualified deferred compensation on the other, in general differ from one another; both of them,
moreover, differ from the deferral provided by a nonqualified deferred annuity or a market discount bond, which are algebraically similar to one another. See note 79. In general,
qualified funded deferred compensation is a more powerful mechanism, in the sense that,
for consistent discounting and other financial assumptions, it produces more value than
pure deferral. It defers taxation of both some amount that otherwise would initially be
included in income and the income from investing the temporary tax savings until the
deferral is terminated. Pure deferral, in contrast, taxes the investment income in the interim, as reflected in expression (1). The latter, in turn, is in the same sense more powerful
than the treatment of deferred annuities and market discount bonds, which only defer the
investment income from an otherwise tax-paid investment. Despite their technical differences, all versions share the basic properties of deferral identified in Part IV.
128 The marginal rates surveyed include 33, 45, 48, 56, 57, and 62%, rates at which matters of relevance to the discussion that follows occur. Spreadsheets containing the calculations involved for the entire array of marginal rates are available from the author.
125
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Whether the gain in this example is taxed as it accrues (line 2),129 or
only on surrender (lines 4-7), the terminal values of the contract are
(as in Part IV) strictly decreasing with the marginal tax rate. But as
foreshadowed in Part IV, the value of deferral-the difference between those two terminal values-takes on a maximum of $345.68, at
a marginal rate of 48%, as reported in line 9. In Table 11 the duration
of deferral has been extended from seven to fourteen years; in that
event the marginal rate that maximizes the value of deferral in line 9
declines to 45%. Taken together these illustrations are consistent with
Brady's basic finding, explored in Part IV, that the future benefit of
deferral via a tax-deferred savings vehicle attains a maximum at a
marginal rate below 50%, with the value-maximizing marginal rate
decreasing as the duration of deferral is prolonged. 130
Although there are other possibilities, what seems to me the most
natural way of evaluating the benefit of deferral from a practical and
policy perspective is also the most straightforward: comparing the dollar value of the benefit conferred on taxpayers at differing marginal
rates. 13 1 Using that measure, whether the benefit of deferral should
be viewed as differing qualitatively from that of a preferential rate will
depend on whether its value is maximized above or below the prevailing top marginal rate. That, in turn, depends on both the existing rate
structure and the parameters (interest rate and duration) that determine the marginal rate at which value is maximized. As to the former,
with a current top individual rate below 40%, in a political environment in which marginal rates seem more likely to go down than up, it
129 Line 2 can be interpreted here as the accrual of value at r*(1 - z), as though the
annual tax liabilities had been satisfied out of the account, leaving it to grow at the aftertax rate of return.
130 As noted in Part IV, however, they do not substantiate Brady's further claim that
those properties are preserved when the future accumulations are discounted to present
value. In Tables 10 and 11, the future values of the benefit of deferral (line 7) are discounted to present value at after-tax discount rates (line 11). The present values are maximized at 56% and 62%. Brady's contrary claim stems from his discounting the benefit of
deferral to the taxpayer at pretax discount rates, as illustrated in line 12 of Tables 10 and
11, equivalent to dividing them by a constant. See note 123.
131 Lines 3, 8, and 10 of Tables 10 and 11 are discussed in Section V.B. Lines 13-17
report other ways of evaluating the variation with marginal rates in the benefit of deferral
suggested by readers of earlier versions of this Article. They include (1) the percentage
change in the value of deferral as a fraction of the terminal value without deferral (line 13),
(2) the percentage change in after-tax rates of return, with and without deferral (line 14),
(3) the gross change in after-tax rates of return (line 15), (4) the difference in effective tax
rates, with and without deferral (line 16), and (5) the ratio of effective tax rates, with and
without deferral (line 17). Only (2) appears to be strictly increasing in the marginal rate.
Numbers (1), (3) and (4) achieve interior maxima (and (3) and (4) are essentially redundant), while (5) appears to be strictly decreasing with the marginal rate of tax-that is, the
effective tax rate with deferral becomes closer to the statutory rate with increasing marginal rates-although that may simply reflect that the statutory rate in the denominator is
getting larger.
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could be a matter of practical relevance. Whether it is turns on for
how long savings are invested and the rate(s) of return that they earn.
Duration and earnings rates enter roughly symmetrically 132 into the
determination of present and future values. In the abstract, the
shorter the duration and the lower the earnings rate, the closer the
value-maximizing rate will be to 50%; increases in either earnings
rates or duration will lower the value-maximizing marginal rate. Interest rates are unpredictable; the duration of deferral depends on individual behavior. Given those uncertainties it is not obvious what
assumptions should be used to estimate the marginal rate at which the
value of deferral will typically be maximized. What one can do is calculate the value-maximizing rate across a range of values for earnings
rates and duration, and explore their implications for plausible assumptions about (or evidence bearing on) those values.
One such set of computations, for earnings rates (r) from 3%-9%
and periods of deferral (n) ranging from fifteen to forty-five years
years, is arrayed in Table 12.133
TABLE

12

ACCUMULATION (n, r) maximized @ z

=

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

0.09

15
20
25

0,48
0.48
0.47

0.48
0.47
0.46

0.47
0.46
0.45

0.47
0.46
0.45

0.46
0.44
0.44

0.46
0.44
0.43

0.45
0.44
0.42

30
35
40
45

0.47
0.46
0.45
0.45

0.45
0.45
0.44
0.43

0.44
0.43
0.43
0.42

0.43
0.42
0.41
0.40

0.42
0.41
0.40
0.39

0.41
0.40
0.39
0.38

0.40
0.39
0.38
0.36

r=
n =

The value-maximizing marginal rate is as high as 48% (at r = 0.03
and n = 15); it declines into the high 30's only for combinations of

earnings rates at or above 7%, and deferral periods of thirty-five years
or more, falling as low as 36% for deferral at 9% over forty-five
years. 134 But even for someone who began systematically saving at
132See note 95.

133A comparable matrix would differ only slightly for other species of deferral. Qualified deferred compensation, for example, would range from 48% to 35%, with the southeast corner of the matrix slightly more heavily populated with value maximizing marginal
rates in the high 30's.
134 A careful inspection of the plots in Brady's Figure 8 suggests that the value-maximizing marginal rates in Table 12 are consistent with his, which (assuming a 6% earnings rate)
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age twenty-five (not, I suspect, an especially widespread phenomenon) and continued until age seventy (more common, I think), the
average period of deferral over a working lifetime would still be
roughly twenty to twenty-five years, 135 so that even with sustained
earnings averaging as high as 9% annually, the value-maximizing marginal rate would still be 40% or more. It seems to me more plausible
that long-term earnings on retirement savings are in the vicinity of 5%
-6%, in which event the value-maximizing marginal rate would be in
the mid 40's. All things considered, Table 12 suggests that the value of
deferral typically will be maximized at or above 40%. In practice,
then, its value in connection with tax-favored savings vehicles seems
likely to increase with marginal rates, at least within the confines of
the currently prevailing schedule of rates.

B.

Assets Subject to PreferentialTiming

The treatment of assets subject to preferential timing is considerably more complex, and at the same time of less practical significance.
When they are valued by discounting their anticipated future cash
flows they take on a maximum only at marginal rates in excess of
50%, increasing with earnings rates and duration, as illustrated in Part
IV. 1 36 Assuming (as seems likely) that tax rates will remain below

50% for the foreseeable future, we should as a practical matter expect
that assets subject to preferential timing will behave as though their
values were strictly increasing with marginal rates, just as conventional wisdom has it. Having come thus far, however, it is worth addressing the matter, at least to identify the issues involved. The added
difficulty, beyond those encountered when analyzing the future value
of deferral, is that, even though the values of preferentially-taxed assets may vary with marginal tax rates, a basic tenet of financial economics is that assets with identical cash flows must trade at a single

show the value of deferral increasing up to marginal rates in the high 30's and mostly above
40% at all durations under fifty years. Brady, note 15, at 20.
135 That is just a ballpark guess, premised on the assumption that earlier contributions
would produce more value attributable to deferral, while later contributions would be
larger, so that the average duration of deferral, taking into account dollar-weighted time of
contribution, would be around the midpoint of the forty-five-year period of accumulation.
One study of retirement savings suggests that twenty-five to thirty-year olds participate in
contributory employer-sponsored defined contribution plans at about 60%-65% of the rate
at which individuals aged thirty-five to sixty contribute on average to such plans. David
Joulfaian & David Richardson, Who Takes Advantage of Tax-Deferred Savings Programs?
Evidence from Federal Income Tax Data, 54 Nat'l Tax J. 669, 675-76, tbls. 2A, 2B (2010).
136 See notes 83 and 123 and accompanying text.
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price.137 The interaction of value and price substantially complicates
the analysis.
To see why, reconceive Table 10 as illustrating a preferentially-taxed
counterpart of the instrument illustrated in Table 2: a 10% pure discount bond, priced (for the moment) at $5131.58 and surrendered in
seven years for $10,000, with the gain deferred until realization on
surrender and taxed as ordinary income at that time. 13 8 Each taxable
investor would pay tax on the realized gain in the amounts arrayed in
line 6, and would be left with the same after-tax proceeds as the
holder of the deferred annuity contract, reported in line 7. (The resulting after-tax rates of return are reported in line 8.139) The benefit
of deferral is still the difference, reported in line 9, between the aftertax proceeds in line 7 and the terminal values reported for comparison
in line 2, which assume instead that the interest had been taxed as it
accrued.1 40 At each marginal tax rate, the future value of the after-tax

proceeds (line 7) and the value of deferral (line 9) are discounted to
present value in lines 10 and 11, in each instance at an after-tax discount rate r(1 - z), with r equal to 10%. Line 10 thus reports the
present values of the after-tax surrender proceeds from the instrument, when priced at $5131.58 and preferentially taxed, to investors at
the illustrated marginal rates; line 11 is the excess of those present
values over that price.
137 Berk & DeMarzo, note 9, at 72-76; Brealey et al, note 9, at 54-55. In this setting the
pretax cash flows are identical; variations in a characteristic (here marginal tax rates) of
particular holders are what induce variations in value.
138That is the treatment that currently applies to market discount bonds under § 1276,
and how OlD was taxed before 1969. See Sims, Long-Term Debt, note 12, at 319-20. As a
zero-coupon bond, some part of the observed discount would of necessity be taxed as it
accrues under § 1272, so that only the discount beyond its adjusted issue price would be
preferentially taxed. For illustrative purposes think of this interpretation of Table 10 as
illustrating a newly issued OID bond as it was taxed before 1969.
139 Those rates are computed, assuming annual compounding, as (Pr/$5131.58) 7 - 1,
where Pr is the after-tax proceeds on surrender. See Brealey et al., note 9, at 111-13.
140 In this instance line 2 should be interpreted as assuming that for tax purposes value
had accrued to the instrument at its pretax yield to maturity, as required by § 1272(a), with
the tax liabilities resulting from the periodic accruals satisfied from other resources. The
reported values therefore consist of the redemption price at maturity, reduced by the (future) value at that time of the tax liabilities previously levied on the discount as it accrued.
Assuming that the opportunity cost of the resources used to satisfy those liabilities is the
same as the yield to maturity on the bond, that treatment is equivalent in future (or present) value to satisfying the tax on each year's accrued interest in a financial account out of
the account balance itself, directly reducing its rate of return (at marginal rate z) from r to
r(1 - z), and the terminal account balance, as reflected above in note 129. See Sims, note 1,
at 234-35 and Appendix. For completeness, line 3 reports the after-tax realized compound
rates of return on the accrued after-tax gain, computed as described in note 139. Since the
values in line 2 reflect taxation of the gain as it accrued, the computed after-tax rates of
return are in each case the pretax rate of return multiplied by (1 - z). That is, with accrual
taxation, pretax rates of return are reduced by the marginal tax rate. See Sims note 1, at
236.
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As was to be expected from Part IV, the present values in line 10

exceed $5131.58 for each taxable investor, attaining a maximum of
$5380.85 to an investor taxed at 56%. (The present value of the associated deferral is $249.27.141) What is more, at each marginal rate the
after-tax rates of return to the preferentially-taxed asset (line 8), exceed the after-tax returns from a conventionally-taxed investment that

yielded a 10% pretax return (line 3). Thus, to taxpayers in each
bracket the asset subject to preferential timing will be worth more,
and will produce a higher after-tax rate of return,142than a conventionally-taxed but otherwise comparable investment.

Given those properties, $5131.58 is unlikely to be an equilibrium
price. We would expect instead that its price will be bid up, thereby
"capitalizing" the benefit of preferential taxation into the asset price,
and in the process reducing both its pre- and after-tax rates of return. 1 43 Assuming that is so, what remains to be explored is the extent
to which that will occur.

Assets Subject to a PreferentialRate

1.

That is a question to which there is no definitive answer, even in
simpler settings involving assets subject to a preferential tax rate,
whose values strictly increase with marginal rates. The canonical example is state and local debt, the interest on which is exempt from
That is calculated as the difference between the present value of the preferentiallytaxed asset and its price (assumed for the moment to be $5131.58), and as reported in line
11, is also maximized at 56%.
142 That the asset is worth more than its price is a function of the assumption that the
price is equal to the asset's pretax present value. At any higher price there will be some
holders for whom the asset will produce after-tax returns inferior to those on a conventionally-taxed investment. See text and note at note 159 below.
The raw difference between after-tax rates of return on the preferentially (line 8) and
conventionally (line 3) taxed investments, reported in line 15, is also positive at every marginal rate, and attains a maximum (of about 0.7%, or 70 basis points) at a marginal rate of
55%. Using as an index instead that difference, expressed as a percentage of the after-tax
rate of return on the conventionally-taxed investment, on the other hand, the benefit is
strictly increasing in the marginal rate, as reported in line 14. That property, however, may
simply be an artifact of the fact that while the raw difference in after-tax rates of return is
falling for marginal rates above 55%, the denominator of the fraction (RORDefladRORA-a), r*(1 - z), is likewise falling with z, an aspect of the calculation that itself induces a rise
in the reported statistic as tax rates go up. Compare note 131 above.
143 When bidding up asset prices in response to preferential taxation is facilitated by
borrowing, it is often referred to as "tax arbitrage." See generally David J. Shakow, Confronting the Problem of Tax Arbitrage, 43 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1987); Theodore S. Sims, Debt,
Accelerated Depreciation, and the Tale of a Teakettle: Tax Shelter Abuse Reconsidered,
42 UCLA L. Rev. 263, 298-311 (1994); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Accelerated Capital Recovery,
Debt, and Tax Arbitrage, 38 Tax Law. 549 (1985).
141
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There one might expect, at least in a theoretical world free of

financial friction, that preferentially-taxed assets would migrate into
the hands of those taxed at the top marginal rate, 145 to whom their
value was greatest. In such a world their prices would be bid up to the

point at which, even taking into account of preferential taxation, they
produced after-tax returns to the highest bracket investors just slightly

better than the after-tax returns they could earn on conventionallytaxed assets. 146 In practice, however, that has not proved to be so.

Even with tax-exempt bonds, prices typically have not been bid up to
the point at which the benefits of the exemption are capitalized at the
highest marginal rate. Instead they have been priced to produce
yields that are attractive to investors taxed at lower rates, producing
windfall benefits to inframarginal investors, with the magnitude of the

windfall increasing with their marginal rate. 147 So the evidence does
not suggest that assets subject to a preferential rate are invariably
priced so that they are valuable only to those taxed at the highest
marginal rates.

144 IRC § 103; e.g., Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice 335-36 (4th ed. 1984).
145 E.g., Richard C. Green, A Simple Model of the Taxable and Tax-Exempt Yield
Curve, 6 Rev. of Fin. Stud. 233, 234 (1993). The entailed assumptions usually include the
absence of transaction costs, and the ability of all financial actors to borrow without limit at
a common risk-free rate. Id. at 237.
146 To investors taxed at lower marginal rates, conventionally-taxed investments would
produce better after-tax returns. Take a simple example: If taxable bonds yield 10% in a
world with a top marginal rate of 40%, a market for tax-exempt municipal bonds of comparable risk and maturity in which the tax exemption had been "fully capitalized" would
price the latter to yield about 6%. A 40% bracket investor then would be essentially indifferent between taxable and tax-exempt bonds, both yielding about 6% after tax. An investor taxed at any lower marginal rate would do better investing in taxable bonds yielding
10% before tax, on which they would earn better than 6% after tax.
147 E.g., M. Arak and K. Geuntner, The Market for Tax-Exempt Issues: Why Are the
Yields So High, 36 Nat'l Tax J. 145 (1983); Green, note 145, at 234; Andrew Ang, Vineer
Bhansali & Yuhang Xing, Taxes on Tax-Exempt Bonds, 65 J. Fin. 565 (2010). The phenomenon is sufficiently persistent that it is referred to in the finance literature as the "municipal bond puzzle." E.g., John M.R. Chalmers, Default Risk Cannot Explain the Muni
Puzzle: Evidence from Municipal Bonds That Are Secured by U.S. Treasury Obligations,
11 Rev. Fin. Stud. 281 (1998).
If, in the example above, tax-exempt bonds were priced to yield 8% rather than 6%, an
investor taxed at 20% would be indifferent between taxable and tax-exempt bonds, earning an 8% after-tax return in either case. An inframarginal investor taxed at 30% would
do 1% better in tax-exempt than in taxable bonds, while a 40% bracket investor would do
2% better.
The ability to borrow freely to finance the purchase of tax-favored assets would facilitate
the capitalization of tax benefits. But the resulting "tax arbitrage" has been regarded with
sufficient suspicion that it is inhibited by a series of provisions designed to limit the deductibility of interest on borrowing to finance tax-favored investments. E.g., IRC § 265 (the
provision relating specifically to debt-financed investments in tax-exempt bonds). Such
provisions probably contribute to incomplete capitalization. See, e.g., authorities cited in
note 143 above.
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Assets Subject to PreferentialTiming

Assets subject to preferential timing present a more complex picture, in part because their value is not monotonically increasing with
the tax rate. To that one must add that (1) in contrast with tax-exempt
bonds, their tax liabilities and after-tax cash flows change whenever
they are repriced, 148 and (2) as Parts III-IV suggest, the task of determining their after-tax present values and rates of return is more difficult than calculating the yield to maturity on a tax-exempt bond or
ascertaining how the latter should be priced in comparison with conventionally-taxed debt. Taking those added complications into account, experience with tax-exempt bonds inspires little confidence
that an asset subject to preferential timing will be priced to equal its
value at the marginal rate at which that value is maximized.
But the matter turns out to be even more complicated than that:
The mere act of repricing an asset subject to preferential timing has
the effects of altering (a) the asset's value at every marginal rate, (b)
its maximized value, and (c) the marginal rate at which its value is
maximized. Waiving any objections based on the practical difficulties
noted above, then, one can explore the latter phenomena by assuming
that the asset in Table 10 is repriced to sell for $5380.85, its maximized
value (attained in the hands of a 56% bracket investor) when originally conceived of as priced at $5131.58.
The results are depicted in Table 13.

148 This is not unique to assets subject to preferential timing, but it does add a level of
complexity not encountered when (as with tax-exempt bonds) the cash flows from the asset
itself are unaffected by taxation. Even there, it must be added, dealings in tax-exempt
bonds may give rise to taxable cash flows, as when they are disposed of after having been
acquired in the market at a discount. IRC § 1276; see the authorities cited in note 147
above.
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Once again line 2 reports the future value of the purchase price
assuming that periodic increases in the value of the bond were taxed
as they accrued.1 49 Lines 4-6 detail the computation of the after-tax
value assuming taxation at the time of surrender, as reported again in
line 7. Note, first, that to a 56% bracket holder, both the after-tax
surrender value of the asset (line 7) and, more importantly, its present
value (line 10), have increased, in the latter case from $5380.85 to
$5484.12; that is because the increase in the purchase price reduces the
realized gain and tax on surrender, leading to higher net surrender
proceeds after tax. So, even though as originally priced the asset's
value was maximized at 56%, repricing it to that maximized value produces an additional increase in its after-tax value to a holder taxed at
that marginal rate. Even as repriced, the asset continues to be preferentially taxed, so even to that holder it continues to be worth more
than its price. 150
Second, and in contrast, the value of deferral to the 56% bracket
investor, after discounting the surrender proceeds to present value
and subtracting the increased purchase price, has declined, from
$249.27 to $103.27 (line 11). That is because repricing the asset has
reduced both the gain to be taxed and the resulting tax liability; the
less tax there is to be deferred the less value there is to deferring it.151
Finally, and most notably, after having been repriced to its original
value as maximized at 56%, the asset's after-tax present value, as a
function of the marginal tax rate, continues to exhibit the same sort of
parabolic profile as it did at its original price, as may be seen by comparing lines 10 of Tables 13 and 10. Even more strikingly, however,
56% is no longer the value-maximizing marginal rate. The asset's present value continues to increase at marginal rates above 56%: that
value is now maximized at $5501.86, and the present value of deferral
149 The after-tax accruals assume that the purchase price increases at 10% pretax, even
though, after repricing, the pretax rate of return on the investment has been reduced to
about 9.26%. Lines 2 and 3 are there to compare preferential timing with accrual taxation,
and the appropriate baseline against which to compare the benefit of preferential timing
on an asset purchased for $5380.86 is accrual taxation of the same amount invested to earn
the originalpretax yield to maturity. That is what is reported in line 2. Consequently, the
after-tax rates of return in line 3 end up being r*(1 - z). See note 140.
150 After repricing, however, that will not continue to be so at every marginal rate, as it
was before the asset was repriced. See notes 142 and 159 and accompanying text.
151 Determining the value of deferral requires some care. Since the initial investment in
the asset has gone up, the value of deferral will be the difference between the net proceeds
after taxation on surrender, reduced by the terminal value to the investor if instead she had
invested an equivalent amount in an asset yielding 10% pretax, with the periodic increases
in the asset's value taxed as they accrued. See note 149 above. Equivalently, the value of
deferral can be obtained by discounting the net proceeds on surrender to present value at
r*(1 - z), where r is 10%, and subtracting the increased purchase price itself. It will be of
significance that the difference between value and price is smaller after the asset has been
repriced at $5380.85 than it was when originally priced at $5131.58. See note 160.
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at $121.01, both attained at a marginal rate near 70%, as illustrated in
lines 10-11 of Table 13.
3.

Equating Price and Value

It is evident from Table 13 that merely repricing the asset to its original maximized value has not altered the picture by much. The asset
continues to be priced to the 56% bracket holder, and to most other
illustrated holders, 152 at less than what (given its preferential taxation)
it appears to be worth. And both the asset and the deferral it provides
continue to exhibit the same basic pattern of values observed in Table
10, rising up to some marginal rate (now 70% rather than 56%), and
then falling again. So it leaves unanswered whether the asset can ever
be priced so as to equal its value, at least in some holder's hands.
The answer to that question is yes. That it is is suggested by the
fact, just noted in connection with Table 13, that the value of deferral-the difference between present value and price to a 56% bracket
(and it turns out to all other) investors-decreases as the price is bid
up. The contraction of that difference suggests that as the asset is successively repriced to the 56% bracket (or indeed any other) holder the
value of deferral will eventually approach 0. And although in general
the price at which that occurs can be determined only by approximation, in the setting of the single cash-flow investment in Table 10 there
turns out to be an explicit solution.
To obtain that solution, note that the value of a preferentially-taxed
investment of this general sort may be written as
(8)

V-

[S-z(S-P)] _ [S(-z)-zP]
[1+r(1-z)] n

[1+r(1-z)]n

The right hand side of expression (8) simply subtracts tax on the
gain on surrender from the price, and discounts the resulting after-tax
cash flow to the date of purchase at the after-tax discount rate. 153 In
expression (8) the value of the asset (V) on the left-hand side is allowed to differ from its price (P), one of the determinants of that
value. What we want to require, however, is that the asset be priced
152 Table 13 includes a column illustrating the treatment of a holder taxed at 33% (at
two decimal places it is actually 32.69), to whom the asset turns out to be a "breakeven"
investment if priced at $5380.85. See text and note at note 159.
153 In expression (8), S is the surrender price, P is the purchase price, z is the tax rate, n
is the duration of the investment, and r is its implicit pretax return, given S, P, and n. See
note 42. It was used to determine the after-tax present values of the preferentially-taxed
asset in Tables 10-14, for which the baseline values are S = $10,000, n = 7, and r = 0.10.
Preferential taxation is captured implicitly in expression (8) by the fact that the gain is not
taxed until surrender.
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to equal its after-tax value, as given (using P) by the right hand side of
(8); so setting V = P in that expression and solving for p154 produces:

(9)

1-Z

P = S[1+r(-Z)]-Z

By pricing the asset to equal the after-tax present value of its future
cash-flow S, we are effectively requiring-at marginal rate z and price
P-that the asset be a zero net present value investment, taking into
account that it is preferentially taxed. 155 As such, P is the most that an
investor taxed at rate z would be willing to pay. 156 As a zero net present value investment, moreover, we would also expect that its aftertax "internal rate of return" will equal some externally imposed "hurdle rate," on the basis of which its after-tax cash flows have been
discounted. 157 Although less obvious from expression (9) expression

(8) (with V equal to P) implies that the hurdle rate here is r(1 - z), the
after-tax rate of return (given pretax rate of return r and marginal tax
rate z) on a conventionally-taxed investment. 58 So, at price P, ex-

pression (9) produces a zero net present value investment to a zbracket investor, and an after-tax rate of return to that investor equal
to the after-tax return on a conventionally-taxed asset.

In sum, expression (9), by setting the price paid for the asset equal
to the present value of its after-tax cash flows at a given marginal tax
rate z, defines, for that marginalrate, both (1) the maximum that a z-

bracket investor would pay for the asset, and (2) the price at which,
with preferential taxation, the asset produces an after-tax rate of re-

turn equal to what the investor would earn on a conventionally-taxed
investment. It is, in other words, in terms both of value and rate of
return, a "breakeven" price at which a z-bracket investor will be indif154 1 thank David Weisbach for suggesting the pursuit of this line of analysis, and
Thomas Brennan for suggestions bearing on that pursuit.
155 Net present value is the present value of the cash flows from an investment, determined using some externally specified discount rate, taking into account the (undiscounted) price initially paid. For a "zero net present value" investment those two
quantities are equal. See Berk & Demarzo, note 9, at 107-08, 207-08; Brealey et al., note 9,
at 105-13. The parameters in expression (9), r and n, imply some baseline price for the
asset when z = 0, $5131.58 in the illustration. See text and notes at notes 142 and 159.
,156 Since the asset has a zero net present value at price P, its net present value would be
negative at any higher price and would be unprofitable for a z-bracket investor.
157 The "internal rate of return" is defined as the discount rate at which the present
value of the future cash flows from an investment equals its purchase price. Brealey et al.,
note 9, at 111-13. (It is equivalent to the "yield-to-maturity" on a bond. See note 42.) At
that discount rate the asset, by definition, has a zero net present value.
158 In a conventional expression for net present value, the right hand side consists of a
sequence of cash flows received over time, each discounted to present value for the number of periods until it is received. The right-hand side of expression (8) takes the conventional form, assuming a single future cash flow (S); the right hand side of (9) does not.
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ferent between the tax-favored and conventionally-taxed investments.
Those properties are illustrated in Table 14, where the asset has been
priced at $5557.15, as prescribed by expression (9) for the example
with z = 56%. It is the final table in this Article, and merits careful
consideration; it effectively summarizes the entire analysis of the pricing of assets subject to preferential timing. Look first at the column
headed "56%". The asset's value to a 56%-bracket investor (line 10)
is $5557.15, exactly equal to its price. Its after-tax rate of return, 4.4%
(line 8), exactly equals the after-tax yield to that investor on a conventionally taxed instrument with a 10% pretax yield (line 3). It follows
that the present value of deferral in line 11-the difference between
the asset's value and its price -is $0: The benefit of preferential timing has been entirely capitalized away. To a 56%-bracket investor the
asset exhibits exactly the properties of a zero-net present value investment implied by expression (9).
Consider next line 8 of the Table, which reports after-tax rates of
return at other marginal rates, together with line 3, which reports after-tax returns on the conventionally taxed alternative and line 15,
which records their differences. At lower marginal tax rates, to the
left of 56%, the after-tax return on the preferentially taxed asset is less
than that on the conventional alternative, with that difference increasing as the marginal tax rate goes down. The asset's value (line 10) is
likewise less than its $5557.15 price to investors taxed at marginal
rates below 56%; hence, the value of deferral in line 11 is negative at
those marginal rates, becoming more negative as the marginal rate
declines.
Turn, finally, to the columns to the right of 56%, which report the
outcomes to inframarginal investors. To them, the value of the asset
(line 10) continues to exceed its price. To them, the present value of
deferral (line 11), $0 at a 56%, is positive. And to them, the preferentially taxed asset produces a windfall return: its after-tax return (line
8) exceeds the return on the conventionally-taxed alternative (line 3),
as summarized in line 15 (where it was likewise 0 at 56%). Moving to
the right the values in lines 10, 11, and 15 all initially increase with the
marginal tax rate. But those increases are not monotonic; to the inframarginal investors the asset's value, the value of deferral, and the
preference-induced excess return all peak at a marginal rate of about
80%, 'where the asset attains a value of $5611.39, and deferral is worth
$54.24. At higher marginal rates they begin to decline, to $5607.61
and $50.46, at 85%. So, even after having been repriced to equal its
value to the 56% investor, at higher marginal tax rates the value of the
asset continues to exhibit the valuation properties characteristic of
preferential timing that have been elucidated in this Article.
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I have, by happenstance, illustrated the implications of expression
(9) at 56%, simply because that was the rate at which the value of the
investment in Table 10 was maximized when initially priced at
$5131.58. The expression is self-evidently more general than that. For
the illustration in that Table it defines a breakeven price for any chosen marginal rate. More generally still, it defines a breakeven price
for any collection of discounting assumptions (r and n) and any single
future cash flow (S). And it also defines the range of feasible (or at
least plausible) prices in a taxable world for an investment of this general sort, consisting of a single investment and a single subsequent
cash flow. For our example, with r = 0.10 and n = 7, those prices
should range from not less than $5131.58 (at z = 0) to not more than
about $5882 (as z approaches 100%).159
This example is special in having an explicit solution. More complex examples involving multiple cash flows are generally not comparably well-behaved. But since preferential timing in principle can be
broken down into a series of constituent cash flows each enjoying
some species of deferral, whether taking the same form as expression
(8) or one of the other mechanisms surveyed in Parts III-IV, one
pattern of relationwould expect them to exhibit the same general 16
0
price.
and
value,
ships among marginal tax rates,
The price given by expression (9) is strictly increasing in the marginal tax rate. It may therefore be interpreted as showing that the maximum price that an investor should be willing to pay for an asset
subject to preferential timing of this general sort is strictly increasing
in the marginal tax rate. And that, in turn, may be viewed as consistent with the conventional wisdom that the benefit of preferential taxExpression (9) evidently equals S/(1 * r)', $5131.58 on the discounting assumptions
here, at z = 0. At z = 1 it takes the indefinite form 0/0; but by differentiating the numerator
and denominator, L'Hopital's rule may be used to show that it approaches S/(1 + rt) as z -.
1, yielding a maximum value of $10,000*(1/1.7), or about $5882, at r = 0.10 and n = 7. That
range explains why the asset is more valuable than its price to all investors only at
$5131.58. See text at note 142. It also explains the entries in the 33% column in Table 13:
The price there, $5380.85, is the breakeven price given by expression (9) for a 33%
investor.
160 In the context of the simple example here, and even in the absence of expression (9),
one could still estimate the price at which price equaled after-tax value by successive approximation, as suggested in the text. For fixed r, n, and z, the process of recursive substitution into expression (8) is technically a "contraction mapping" (or "contraction");
because the present value of the after-tax proceeds with each iteration increases by less
159

than the increase in price, their difference-the value of deferral-becomes smaller with
each iteration. See note 151 and accompanying text. In such circumstances, a theorem by
Stefan Banach assures that at every marginal rate the process will converge to a unique
"fixed point," $5557.15 at 56% in the example. See Victor Bryant, Metric Spaces: Iteration and Application 57-60 (1985). In the example, expression (9) gives the fixed points for
each marginal rate explicitly; it seems reasonable to expect that one could approximate
those solutions recursively for more complicated assets subject to deferral.
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ation is strictly increasing with marginal rates. But that is not the
entire story. For one thing, expression (9) does not by itself tell us
anything about where the asset will actually be priced, other than that
it should (in this example) be greater than $5132 and less than $5882.
It does not tell us that the asset will actually be priced at the most that
the top-bracket investor would be willing to pay, 161 any more so than
the extent to which tax-exempt bond prices are capitalized at the highest marginal rate. On the other hand, since the maximum price is
strictly increasing in the marginal tax rate, expression (9) defines, implicitly at least, a one-to-one mapping from the set of observed prices
for the asset to the set of marginal rates. That is, given a discounting
horizon n and a pretax earnings rate r, to any observed price for the
asset there corresponds a unique marginal tax rate at which the asset's
value exactly equals its price. What is more, corresponding to
whatever price might actually be observed for the asset, expression (9)
defines the marginal rate such that an investor taxed at any lower rate
would find the asset unattractive. Conversely, as illustrated in Table
14 for a 56%-bracket investor, every inframarginal investor would
find it attractive, in terms both of the relationship between its price
and its value, and between its after-tax rate of return and the after-tax
return on a conventionally-taxed investment.
But, at least for present purposes, the important observation is this;
for an asset like a tax-exempt bond, subject to a preferential rate (in
that instance 0), the windfall benefit of the asset to inframarginal investors will be strictly increasing in their marginal rates. In contrast,
once an asset subject to preferential timing has been priced to have a
zero net present value at some marginal rate, its value(s) to those
taxed at higher marginal rates will continue to exhibit the properties
whose description has been the central objective of this Article.
Those properties are illustrated in lines 10-11 of Table 14. Even after
being priced at the $5557 maximum that a 56% bracket investor
would pay, the asset's value (as well as the value of the deferral it
provides) to inframarginal investors, does not monotonically increase:
it attains a maximum of about $5611, to an investor taxed at approximately 80%,162 declining thereafter towards the observed $5557 price
as the marginal rate approaches 100%, as illustrated in line 10.

161 Even assuming, it must be added, that marginal rates were sufficiently high to make
that a realistic possibility.
162 The maximum is actually attained at 79%, differing by pennies from the reported
value at 80%.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

It is puzzling that, with all the attention that tax deferral has commanded, 163 the facet of the problem explored in this Article has remained obscure for so long. 16 The reasons are probably many. One
may have simply been the unexamined extension of what is undeniably true of tax rate preferences to the conclusion that deferral was
comparably advantageous. 165 Beyond that, in analyzing the problem,
analysts appear to have taken as a starting point some given amount
of income deferred, and analyzed the impact using a given discount
rate.1 66 While that seems like a natural point of departure, it omits
from the equation the role of the taxpayer's marginal rate in determining jointly both the amount of tax payment deferred and the rate
at which that amount is discounted to present value. What emerges,
however, from studying the operation of the Samuelson theorem is
that it is the interaction between the offsetting effects of a taxpayer's
marginal rate on their after-tax cash flows and their after-tax discount
is
rate that produces Samuelson's original result, at least when income1 67
requires.
effectively
theorem
that
taxed as it currently accrues, as
But even when the conditions for application of the theorem are not
satisfied, it is still the case, at least with respect to pure timing preferences, that the marginal rate influences value both through its impact
on after-tax cash flows and on the rate at which they are discounted.
So it appears to be a failure to have modelled the problem in a manner that preserves both of those effects that has left the property highlighted by this Article (largely) undetected for so long.
At the same time it must be acknowledged, given both our prevailing structure of tax rates and our still relatively low interest rates, that
the properties explored here, and in the work of Peter Brady, are at
least for now of limited relevance to the formulation of tax policy.
With the top marginal tax rate below 50%, the value of assets subject
to preferential timing will in practice increase with marginal rates.
And even though the future value of deferral, as under tax-favored
savings plans, is maximized at marginal rates below 50%, with the
value-maximizing rate falling with increases in earnings rates and duration, it remains the case that those values, too, will in practice be
maximized at marginal rates above the prevailing top rate. So, at
163 See notes 4 and 27; see, e.g., Mitchell L. Engler, Partial Basis Indexation: An Implicit Response to Tax Deferral, 53 Tax L. Rev. 177 (2000); Mitchell L. Engler, Partial Basis
Indexation: Tax Arbitrage and Related Issues, 55 Tax L. Rev. 69 (2001); Stephen B. Land,
Defeating Deferral: A Proposal for Retrospective Taxation, 52 Tax L. Rev. 45 (1996).
164 This paragraph was originally composed on February 28, 2013.
165See, Surrey, Tax Incentives, note 4, at 720-23; Surrey, Tax Deferral, note 4, at 317-18.
166 See note 76, and text accompanying note 71.
167Sims, note 35, at 4-6.
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least in the current environment, it does not appear as though the
matters developed in this Article are likely to move the needle in policy terms any time soon. Even so, those matters seem worth having
explored. They leave open whether the Roth and conventional vehicles used to deliver incentives under qualified retirement plans are
better understood as providing an exemption for investment income,
or deferral. They have produced the entirely unexpected and counterintuitive insight that the valuation properties of preferential timing behave differently depending on whether they are expressed in present
or future values. And, having explored the interrelated effects of marginal tax rates on cash-flow and discounting, and how they drive the
result in the Samuelson theorem, they also illustrate that departures
from accrual taxation exhibit valuation properties that are a good deal
more complicated than has hitherto been thought to be so. There may
even be an intrinsic value to that.
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